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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The guiding question for the following inquiry is how 
thought enables a thinker to understand. The end of the 
inquiry is the exploration of this question. The means 
employed is the interpretation of a book: The Proslogion, by 
Anselm of Canterbury. In his Proslogion, Anselm attempts to 
think his way to an understanding of God. I will argue that 
his desire to understand God leads Anselm to shift his 
conception of thinking. At the beginn~ng of the book, he 
tries to use thinking about God to express what God is by 
the analysis of what he believes God to be, but he finally 
turns to think in other ways. First he turns to what he 
calls "coniectatio," and then he turns to prayer. 
This inquiry will raise important questions regarding 
thinking, understanding, and the relationship between the 
two. Anselm describes how he understands "thinking" 
(cogitare) early in his small book, and he exemplifies that 
description all the way through the work that follows. The 
description he gives is, however, a general one, and as his 
work progresses it exemplifies that general description in 
very different ways. Though his treatment of "understanding" 
(intelligere) is less explicit, we can deduce clearly enough 
how he understands this word as well. Anselm aims at under-
2 
standing, and he takes thinking as his means. 
I take the interpretation of his thinking as my means 
not just in order to understand Anselm, but to better under-
stand the relationship between thinking and understanding. 
When Anselm concludes his work by turning his thinking 
towards God directly, he suggests to us the orientation 
required by a thinking that is to lead towards understand-
ing--at least towards an understanding of God. 
Let us begin by considering the nature of the book. In 
the preface to the Proslogion, Anselm describes his task in 
a number of ways: in terms of distinctions between it and 
the Monologion, in terms of the hope he has for the one 
"argumentum" it contains, and in terms of the persona in 
which it is written. He characterizes the work most strik-
ingly, though, with the titles he gave it. It is telling 
enough that he eventually named it the Proslogion. This 
means, he reports, an "alloquium," which is to say a speech 
to another or an address. 1 He calls it an address because 
the book is a speech, or prayer, directed to God. Anselm 
prays to God in the first chapter, in the last, and in many 
places in between. I will argue that the work's composition 
as a prayer is essential to it. 
But Anselm did not originally call his work the 
1 Anselm, Opera Omnia, ed. Franciscus Schmitt, (Edinburg: 
Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1946) 1:94. "Alloquium" comes from 
"ad-loquor," "to· speak to." 
3 
"Proslogion." He also reports that the title he originally 
gave the book was "Fides Quaerens Intellectum" or "Faith 
Seeking Understanding." 2 In order to chart the shifts in the 
character of Anselm's thought I will attempt to establish 
what this first title meant. To ask about the character of 
Anselm's thinking is to ask how faith seeks understanding in 
the Proslogion. 
I can make one preliminary claim that is not controver-
sial: that the search has something to do with discursive 
reasoning, or analytical thought--at least in part with what 
has come to be called "the ontological argument for the 
existence of God." Anselm himself labels the insight he set 
out to find an "argumentum," 3 and whether or not this word 
is synonymous with our word "argument," much of the first 
part of the Proslogion is in fact an argument of sorts: it 
is an analysis of one way of stating what Anselm believes 
God to be. We must ask, however, how the argument functions 
as a part of his whole search. Is Anselm's search the search 
for this argument? Is the search the analysis of the argu-
ment? Is the argument merely one stage in the search? Is it 
a tool that leads the seeker to seek in some other way? I 
will argue that it is, first and foremost, just such a tool. 
It is important to recognize at the start, however, that 
it is not at all obvious that thinking is a suitable means 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid. 
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of seeking to understand God. Augustine, who was a great au-
thority for Anselm, points to the problem in his work On the 
Trinity. Anselm makes it clear, in the preface to the 
Monologion, that just this work was decisive for him. There, 
Anselm def ends himself against anyone who would attack his 
own work as novel by arguing that he writes nothing in the 
Monologion that is not in Augustine's work: 
If it should seem to anyone that I have put forth any-
thing in this little work that either is too novel or 
that differs from the truth, I ask that he not immedi-
ately shout that I introduce novelty or assert falsity, 
but that he first study diligently the books by ••• Au-
gustine On the Trinity, and that he then decide about my 
little work according to them. 4 
For Anselm to point to On the Trinity in the preface to this 
earlier work does not assure that he thinks of it as deci-
sive for the Proslogion as well. For now, however, it is 
enough to notice the problem that Augustine faces in that 
work, and to realize that Augustine's problem must have been 
on Anselm's mind. 
In the last of the fifteen books of On the Trinity, 
Augustine describes at some length how human thinking fails. 
I want to consider that account, but before doing so it is 
worth noting that in Book 8 of the same work Augustine 
raises the possibility of using speech to understand God in 
4 Ibid., 8: " ••• si cui videbitur, quod in eodem opusculo 
aliquid protulerim, quod aut nimis novum sit aut a veritate 
dissentiat: rogo, ne statimme aut praesumptorem novitatum aut 
falsitatis assertorem exclamet, sed prius libros praefati 
doctoris Augustini De trinitate diligenter perspiciat, deinde 
secundum eos opusculum meum diiudicet." 
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a manner that is not discursive. 
He has spent the first seven books interpreting passages 
of scripture. By taking what he finds in scripture concern-
ing the Trinity as authoritative, he can draw conclusions 
about the Trinity that are certain to be true. He does not, 
however, think that such accumulated knowledge itself brings 
him or his reader to understand the Trinity, and so he 
devotes the remaining eight books of the work to various 
attempts to understand what the first seven books enable him 
know. 
In the eighth book, he makes his first such attempt. 
Augustine describes how thinking disturbs understanding. He 
exhorts one not to think, but to remain in a flash of light 
that shines when one hears "truth": 
Behold, see if you can: God is truth. For this has been 
written: "Since God is light." [See] not as your eyes 
see, but as the heart sees when it hears: "He is truth." 
Do not ask what truth is; for at once mists of corporeal 
images and clouds of phantasms will present themselves 
and disturb the fair weather that was clear for you at 
the first flash, when I said "truth." Behold, remain if 
you can in that first flash by which you are dazzled as 
though by a shock. 5 
He goes on to deny that one can remain in that flash: 
5 Augustine, Obras de San Agustin en Edicion Bilingue, 
vol. 5, Tratado sobre la Santisima Trinitad, trans. and ed. 
Luis Arias, (Madrid: Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, 1956), 
502: " ••• ecce vide, si potes: Deus veritas est. Hoc enim 
scriptum est: Quoniam Deus lux est: non quomodo isti oculi 
vident, sed quomodo videt cor, cum audis: Veritas est. Noli 
quaerere quid sit veritas; statim enim se opponent caligines 
imaginum corporalium et nubila phantasmatum, et perterbabunt 
serenitatem, quae primo ictu diluxit tibi, cum dicerem: 
"Veritas". Ecce in ipso primo ictu quo velut coruscatione 
perstringeris, cum dicitur: "Veritas", mane si potes ••• " 
6 
"But you cannot; you will slip back into those habitual and 
earthly (ways]." 6 He does nothing at that point to explain 
why one will "slip back." He merely points to "the bird-lime 
of desire" and "the errors of (our] wanderings." One of the 
earthly ways he refers to is the habit of articulating and 
thinking through questions, and he goes on in Book 15 to 
explain why just such thinking interferes with the attempt 
to understand. 
There, Augustine writes of two sorts of human speech: a 
silent word spoken within, and the words--spoken, either in 
silence or out loud, in the languages that people share--
with which one attempts to say this word. Augustine does not 
think that these spoken words ever perfectly articulate the 
word within. Since that inner word is the one with which one 
knows whatever one knows, the spoken words do not articulate 
knowledge. His account emerges as his discussion of the 
human image of the Trinity draws to a close. 
Since one aspect of the Trinity he would like to under-
6 Ibid.: "sed non pates: relaberis in ista solita atque 
terrena." 
Two major translators read the first clause "sed [si] non 
pates": 
The editor of the Spanish bilingual edition, F. Luis 
Arias, translates, "Permanece, si pedes, en la clearheaded 
inicial de este rapido fulgor de la verdad; pero, si esto no 
tees posible ••• " 
Stephen Mckenna offers, "Remain in it, if you can, but if 
you cannot ••• " (St. Augustine, The Trinity, trans. Stephen 
McKenna, Washington D.C.: Catholic Univ. Press, 1963), 247.) 
I do not know why they both thought that Augustine 
intended us to ~upply "si. " The paragraph makes good sense 
without doing so. 
stand is the Word that it speaks, he must see how human 
speech, the speech of the image of that Trinity, is that 
Word's image. He begins his account by noting two facts 
abou.t the manner in which thought is spoken of in the New 
Testament: that thinking is described as inner speech7 and 
that this speech is sometimes heard, but sometimes seen, by 
Jesus. He concludes that there must be some inner speech 
that "does not b~long to any of those languages that are 
called the languages of peoples." 8 This word is the thought 
formed from knowledge, and to speak it is to speak the 
truth: 
7 
For it is necessary that, whenever we speak truly--that 
is, [when] we say what we know--[then], from the very 
knowledge that we hold with our memory, a word is born 
that is entirely of the same kind as the knowledge from 
which it is born. Indeed, the thought formed from that 
thing which we know is a word that we say in the heart. 9 
To the extent that the inner word is the same as the 
knowledge from which it is born, it mirrors the equality 
between the Word and the Father, its source. Augustine goes 
on to explain that human speech is an incarnation of the 
human word and is similar in this sense to the Word that be-
7 We will see that the description of thinking as inner 
speech is decisive for Anselm, too. 
8 Augustine, 866: "hoc enim quod ad nullam pertinet 
linguam, earum scilicet quae linguae appelantur gentium." 
9 Ibid., 868: "Necesse est enim cum verum loquimur, id 
est, quod scimus loquimur, ex ipsa scientia quam memoria 
tenemus, nascatur verbum quod eiusmodi sit omnino, cuiusmodi 
est illa scientia de qua nascitur. Formata quippe cogitatio ab 
ea re quam scimus, verbum est quod in corde dicimus." 
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comes flesh: 
For just as our word becomes a (spoken] utterance, 
[which is], in a certain way, of the body, by assuming 
that [utterance] in which it may be made evident to the 
senses of men, just so the Word of God was made flesh by 
assuming that (utterance] in which it itself might be 
made evident to the senses of men. 10 
But though this word is, in some ways, a fitting image 
of God, it is also quite different from that Word, and just 
this difference is important, because the difficulty that 
thinking in words presents for Anselm lies in the difference 
between the way we speak our word and the incarnation of the 
Word. Unfortunately, Augustine's account says little of this 
difference. Instead, he addresses the differences between 
the human inner word and the Word. A passage in Book 11 of 
the Confessions, however, sheds some light. It points to-
wards the temporal character of speech. 
Time is important even in the account in The Trinity, 
though it is related there to the formation of the human 
inner word: the last difference Augustine identifies between 
that inner word and the Word is that the former comes to be 
and passes away in time: 
And then indeed our word will not be false, because we 
shall neither lie nor be deceived. Perhaps too our 
thoughts will not revolve, passing back and forth from 
some things to others, but we shall see all our knowl-
edge in a single gaze. Nevertheless, even when it is 
thus, even if it is thus, (and] the creature [i.e. our 
thought] that can be formed is so (completely] formed 
10 Ibid. , 8 6 8 : "Ita enim verbum nostrum vox quodam modo 
corporis fit, assumendo earn in qua manifestetur sensibus 
hominum; sicut Verbum Dei caro factum est, assumendo earn in 
qua et ipsum manifestaretur sensibus hominum." 
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that nothing that it ought to attain is missing from its 
form, nevertheless [even then] it will not be made equal 
to that simplicity where nothing that is formable has 
been formed or reformed, but [there is only] form; 
neither unformed nor formed, there the substance is 
eternal and immutable. 11 
That is what he says in On the Trinity. The passage we 
will consider from The Confessions is useful because it 
shows that at least one aspect of the temporality at issue 
in language is temporality in the most straight-forward 
sense: words take time to say. Insofar as the insight one 
strives to express with words is not extended in time, the 
words and the insight are incommensurable. 
In the Confessions, Augustine compares the words with 
which God is reported in Genesis to have created the world 
with the words with which God is said, in the Gospel, to 
have recognized his son as his son. He asks, "How did You 
speak? Was it in the way that the utterance was made that 
said from the cloud: 'This is my beloved son? ' " 12 He replies 
that the voice from the cloud was spoken in time, and he 
11 Ibid., 890: "Et tune quidem verbum nostrum non erit 
falsum, quia neque mentiemur, neque fallemur: fortassis etiam 
volubiles non erunt nostrae cogitationes ab aliis in alia 
euntes atque redeuntes, sed omnem scientam nostram uno simul 
conspectu videbimus: tamen cum et hoc fuerit, si et hoc 
fuerit, formata erit creatura quae formabilis fuit, ut nihil 
iam desit eius formae, ad quam pervenire deberet; sed tamen 
coaequanda non erit illi simplicitati, ubi non formabile 
aliquid formatum vel reformatum est, sed forma; neque 
informis, neque formata, ipsa ibi aeterna est immutabilisque 
substantia." 
12 Augustine, Confessiones, ed. M Skutella, (Leipzig: 
Teubner, 1934), 269: "Sed quomodo dixisti? numquid illo modo, 
quo facta est vox de nube dicens: Hie est filius meus 
dilectus?" 
10 
goes on to explain, "The syllables sounded and went by, the 
second after the first, the third after the second and from 
there, in order, until the last one [sounded] after the 
others and [there was] silence after the last one." 13 He 
also emphasizes that the temporally arranged sounding of 
such words shows that they belong to the motion of a crea-
ture, which is temporal. 14 
Now, though this account does not exactly correspond to 
the one from On the Trinity, a straight-forward picture of 
the latter begins to emerge as long as the two are parallel: 
the difference between human speech and the Word of God may 
be that a difference exists between human speech and the 
word within, the word from which it is born. The words we 
use when we try to speak our inner word take time to say. 
They do not precisely reproduce the word within, a word that 
is formed, Augustine says, "by a single gaze at once" (uno 
simul conspectu). 15 One might, he says, occasionally "see 
all our knowledge in a single gaze, " 16 but the movement by 
which one tries to put that single gaze into words shatters 
13 Ibid.: "Sonuereunt syllabae atque transierunt, secunda 
post primum, tertia post secundam atque inde ex ordine, donec 
ultima post ceteras silentiumque post ultimam." 
14 Ibid.: "Unde claret atque eminet, quod creaturae motus 
expressit earn serviens aeternae voluntati tuae ipse 
temporalis." 
15 The Trinity, 890. 
16 The Trinity, 890. 
11 
its unity by scattering it through time. 17 
The desire to achieve a simple, instantaneous under-
standing by means of thinking is just the difficulty Anselm 
faces in the Prosloqion. He suggests this right from the 
start when he declares, in the book's preface, his desire to 
find a single argument. But it is much more explicit in the 
manner in which he summarizes, in Chapter 18, the result of 
that argument. He writes, "My narrow understanding cannot 
see [God's qualities] in one simultaneous gaze in order to 
delight in them all simultaneously. 1118 
We must insist, however, that in the face of what might 
look, at that point, like failure, Anselm does not give up 
on thinking. When he concludes that analytic thinking, or 
reasoning, cannot bring him to the understanding he desires, 
he does not turn away from thinking, but shifts towards 
other manners of thought. I will chart this shift. I will 
argue that Anselm's discovery that thinking cannot enable 
him to say what God is only leads him to command himself to 
ask how good God· must be, and then to ask for the under-
standing that he lacks. Anselm's thinking, his inner speech, 
shifts from analysis, or reasoning, to what he calls 
coniectatio, and then to prayerful address. These shifts are 
17 A vivid picture of this "scattering" of the understand-
ing by thought is presented long after Anselm's time in the 
anonymous work, The Cloud of Unknowing. 
18 Anselm, 114: "non potest angustus intellectus meus tot 
uno simul intui tu videre, ut omnibus simul delectetur. " I will 
have to return to this line. 
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faith's search for understanding, and their result deter-
mines the Proslogion's ultimate character as a prayer. 
The difficulties that Anselm faces as he strives to 
understand God can thus be described in general terms. If 
understanding is an insight that comes all at once, and 
thinking is characteristically discursive, what connection 
can there be between the two? How can an activity that 
progresses through time lead to another that happens sud-
denly, or all at once? How can speech bring about vision? 
My interpretation of one work by one man can hardly 
offer decisive answers to these questions. But by charting 
where one man's struggle with such questions leads him, I 
can hope at least to understand one way to face these ques-
tions. 
Anselm's book finishes as a prayer, but it starts out as 
a prayer as well. The progress Anselm makes brings him back, 
in a sense, to the point from which he begins. This is not 
to say that he has made no progress at all. He prays at the 
end of his book with a far richer understanding of just 
where he stands. It is, perhaps, this richer understanding 
that permits him to pray at the end of the book with confi-
dence that he does not show at its start. In the very last 
chapter he writes: 
Lord, through Your Son You command, or rather You coun-
sel [us] to seek, and You promise that we shall receive 
so that our joy might be complete. I seek, Lord, what 
You counsel [us] through our admirable counsellor; may I 
receive what You promise through Your truth, so that my 
13 
joy might be complete • 19 
Thus even if Anselm's progress is both from prayer as a 
beginning and to prayer as an end, his progress is progress 
nonetheless. Such progress is not unique to him, not even 
among philosophers. I myself think of Aristotle. He argues, 
in the Metaphysics, that philosophy begins in wonder, and, 
in the Ethics, that it ends in contemplation. It is inter-
esting to note that his word for wonder, "8&•µi~c~'" 
(thaumazein), and his word for contemplation, "Gcmpt &" 
(theoria), are probably cognates, both related to a word, 
11 G:i&" (thea), that means spectacle or sight. Contemplation 
is not the same as simple wonder, but both wonder and con-
templation are rooted in vision. For Aristotle too, at least 
in a sense, the work of thinking takes us to the place from 
which it starts. 
19 Anselm, 121: "Domine, per Filium tuum iubes, immo 
consulis petere et promittis accipere, ut gaudium nostrum 
plenum sit. Peto, Domine, quod consulis per admirabilem 
consiliarium nostrum; accipiam, quod promittis per veritatem 
tuam, ut gaudium meum plenum sit." 
CHAPTER 2 
THE ANALYSIS OF ANSELM'S ARGUMENT 
Anselm's Proslogion is a prayer. It is, however, an 
unusual one. Much of the book is devoted to reasoning: spe-
cifically, to the analysis of a statement with which Anselm 
expresses what he believes God to be. This is odd: when one 
thinks about prayer, one does not think first of analysis. 
When one thinks about analysis, one does not think first of 
prayer. 
The apparent topic of the book's first set of reasonings 
is more surprising still. In its second and third chapters, 
Anselm appears to aim at establishing the existence of the 
God he addresses. I will eventually argue this is not the 
case. Nevertheless, that this is how the analyses in Chap-
ters 2 and 3 appear cannot be denied. The tradition that 
interprets the passages as such an argument is too long and 
too rich. Any interpretation of the book must begin by 
facing it. 
I shall ultimately argue neither for nor against the 
authors within this tradition. Most of them are less con-
cerned with the extent to which such an argument is indeed 
an interpretation of Anselm's work than they are with the 
14 
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rigor of one or more versions of the argument, and I am less 
concerned with the rigor of any particular argument than 
with the role that an argument plays within a prayer. This 
is not at all to say that the validity of his arguments was 
of no importance to Anselm, or even that it is of no impor-
tance to me. It is only to say that the main issue for me is 
the place of argument within Anselm's effort to understand 
God. Let there be no mistake: to understand God was Anselm's 
explicit goal. Because I aim to understand the place of 
Anselm's argument, I will eventually insist on leaving his 
argument in its place. Rather than freeing it from its 
context in order to investigate the full force of the range 
of arguments that Anselm's strategy suggests, I will inter-
pret that strategy as Anselm himself states it. 
I shall nevertheless first consider that part of the 
book that appears to be an argument for the existence of 
God, and I shall consider it as just such an argument. In 
this chapter, I shall investigate two types of current 
analysis of Anselm's argument. I shall argue that the ver-
sions of the argument that have been discussed by the con-
temporary analytic philosophers I discuss are inconclusive 
because they depend on a premise that some are willing to 
deny: that God is even possible. Those within the analytic 
tradition who would support some version of Anselm's argu-
ment, whether they do so with an appeal to ordinary language 
or they do so with an appeal to a private belief, must 
16 
appeal to something outside of the argument itself. This 
fact does not distinguish their versions of the argument 
from any other argument. Arguments have assumptions. It 
does, however, invite us look carefully at just what Anselm 
assumes, or start with. I will take their need to look 
outside of the argument as my invitation to look back to 
Anselm himself in order to show what he himself appeals to. 
The reasons for beginning by attempting to determine 
whether Anselm in fact proves that God exists are of several 
kinds: there is the weight of the tradition I have already 
referred to, one that has used various ways of construing 
Anselm's analyses to determine whether there can be an 
ontological argument for the existence of God; there is 
direct evidence, within the book's second and third chap-
ters, that suggests that he himself thought he had discov-
ered a proof that God exists; and there is other evidence, 
dependant upon studies either of the entire Proslogion or of 
more of Anselm's work, that points in the same direction. 
The tradition that uses the Proslogion as the source of 
arguments for the existence of God began in Anselm's life-
time, and continues to this day. Anselm's older contempo-
rary, Gaunilo of Marmoutier, wrote a reply to the Proslogion 
so interesting to Anselm that he asked those who had already 
copied the book to attach both Gaunilo's reply and his own 
17 
reply to Gaunilo to their copies. 1 Even today, standard 
editions of the book include the two replies. Since Gaunilo, 
the tradition has included European philosophy's most impor-
tant authors: Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus, Descartes, 
Spinoza, Leibniz, Hume, Kant, and Hegel. Nor has interest in 
the argument been limited to the philosophers: the tale of 
Anselmo in Don Quixote suggests a harsh rejection of the 
attempt to prove that God exists. 
The debate continues in this century. Even if Richard 
Swinburne finds that ontological arguments "are unpersuasive 
for well-known reasons" and believes that "everyone who 
reflects on them ought to find the same," 2 Anselm's argument 
remains a matter for dispute. Richard Findlay, Norman 
Malcolm, Charles Hartshorne, and Alvin Plantinga, among 
others, have written on the argument. 
The existence of this tradition, however, is not by 
itself reason enough to interpret the book as an argument 
1 The Life of St. Anselm, Archbishop of Canterbury, by 
Eadmer, ed. and trans. R.W. Southern, (Oxford: Clarendon, 
1972), 31: "[The Proslogion] came into the hands of someone 
who found fault with one of the arguments in it, judging it to 
be unsound. In an attempt to refute it he wrote a treatise 
against it and attached this to the end of Anselm's work. A 
friend sent this to Anselm who read it with pleasure, ex-
pressed his thanks to the critic and wrote his reply to the 
criticism. He had this reply attached to the treatise which 
had been sent to him, and returned it to the friend from whom 
it had come, desiring him and others who might deign to have 
his little book to write out at the end of it the criticism of 
his argument and his own reply to the criticism." 
2 Richard Swinburne, "God's Necessary Being," Archivio Di 
Filosofia 1-3 (1990): 538. 
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for the existence of God. In fact, that there is such a 
tradition might come as a surprise to someone reading the 
book for the first time. Anselm devotes very little of the 
Proslogion to analyses that seem to concern God's existence, 
and although he argues for other claims in much of the rest 
of the book, there are large sections that are not analyses 
at all. He himself calls the book a "proslogion" or an 
"alloquy." This is to say a speech-towards, or an address, 
not a proof, or a discourse. 
Nevertheless, Anselm does seem to announce directly that 
his task is to prove that God exists, and this in two ways. 
In the preface to the work he writes that he sought an 
argument that would suffice, among other things, "to affirm 
that God truly is." 3 I shall have more to say about what 
this phrase in fact means, but both standard translations of 
the book into English, and many other translations as well, 
reflect what the phrase is generally taken to mean: that 
Anselm seeks an argument that proves the existence of God. 
M.J. Charlesworth renders the phrase "to prove that God 
really exists." 4 _S.N. Deane offers "to demonstrate that God 
truly exists. " 5 
If that phrase is not enough, we need only turn to the 
3 Anselm, 93: "ad astruendum quia Deus vere est." 
St. Anselm's Proslogion, trans. M.J. Charlesworth, 
(Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 1979), 103. 
5 St. Anselm: Basic Writings, trans. S.N. Deane, (La 
Salle: Open Court, 1962), 1. 
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end of the second chapter. There, Anselm seems to state 
clearly enough that he has indeed proven that God exists. He 
writes that "there exists, therefore, beyond doubt, some-
thing than which a greater cannot be thought, both in the 
understanding and in fact." 6 
In addition to the weight of a great tradition and the 
direct evidence of Anselm's words, there is a third class of 
reasons for supposing that Anselm sought to prove that God 
exists. Scholars of Anselm's work have based the claim that 
this was Anselm's task on studies both of the Proslogion as 
a whole and of the two replies. I shall consider three such 
arguments: one by Franciscus Schmitt .and two by Kurt Flasch. 
Schmitt, surely the most learned Anselm scholar of our 
century, edited the standard critical Latin edition of 
Anselm's works and translated a number of the works into 
German. He, more than anyone, has been attentive both to the 
words Anselm uses and to the style he employs in using them. 
Schmitt bases his interpretation of the Proslogion on a 
careful look at Anselm's rhetoric. What he discovers is that 
the style Anselm uses in the passages in which he argues is 
different from the style of the rest of the work. Schmitt 
also points out that both Anselm and his biographer-student, 
Eadmer, report that the argument was a sudden discovery. He 
concludes from these two facts that Anselm most likely dis-
6 Anselm, 102: "Existit ergo procul dubio aliquid quo 
maius cogitari non valet, et in intellectu et in re." 
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covered some core argument first and only afterwards com-
posed an address around it. 7 
Why did Anselm set his argument into an address? Schmitt 
answers that Anselm probably chose that form so that the 
Proslogion's style would contrast with that of its companion 
work, the Monologion, which is a monologue, or discourse. 8 
In any case, Schmitt concludes that the Proslogion is essen-
tially, like the other work, an attempt to establish that 
certain truths of faith accord with reason. 9 He thinks that 
its style is simply its wonderful style, and has nothing to 
do with the heart of the work: 
The dressing up [of the work] in a prayer is merely the 
second element [of the work], which gives it its wonder-
ful, almost unique character, but does not at all aim to 
remove from the kernel of the work its speculative character. 
The other arguments I shall consider are quite differ-
7 Anselm von Canterbury: Proslogion, ed. and with a 
German trans. F. Schmitt, (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: frommann-
holzboog, 1984), 32: "Was Anselm auf Wachstafeln schrieb, war 
der spekulative Kern. Diesen in das Kleid eines Gebetes zu 
fassen, war eine weitere gltickliche Eingebung." 
8 Ibid.: "Die !dee der 'Anrede' entsprang sicherlich dem 
Bedtirfnis, dem Monologion gegentiber eine Abwechslung in der 
Form zu bringen." 
9 Ibid., 51: "Zweck und Absicht ·des Btichleins sind, die 
Glaubenswahrheit der Existenz und des Wesens Gottes als 
vernunf tgemaB darzutun. Und zwar gegentiber dem Atheisten 
[sic], dem Leugner eben dieser Glaubenswahrheit. Wie in der 
Apologetik ist der Gegenstand der Spekulation die 
Glaubenslehre, die Methode des Beweisens aber rein 
philosophisch." 
10 Ibid., 32: "Die Einkleidung in ein Gebet ist erst das 
zweite Element, · das ihr den wundervollen, fast einmaligen 
Charakter gibt, das aber nie und nimmer den Kern des Werkes 
ihres spekulativen Charakters entkleiden will." 
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ent. They are made by a prominent German medievalist, Kurt 
Flasch, though he himself points out that his main argument 
had already been made by Schmitt. He considers the character 
of two debates that Anselm engages in: one with the fool, 
who is the imagined interlocutor of the early part of the 
Proslogion, and one with Gaunilo of Marmoutier, who wrote a 
reply to Anselm on behalf of that fool. 
With respect to the first, Flasch claims that the fool 
is what we now call an "atheist." Flasch admits that Anselm 
does not use the word "atheist," but he insists that it is 
our word for precisely the opponent that Anselm has in mind: 
Of course Anselm does not use the word "atheism," which 
first came into use around 1600. But he describes with 
clarity the position that he sought, by means of his 
argument, to reveal to be absurd: the denial of the 
existence of a being "beyond which a more perfect cannot 
be thought." 11 
Flasch claims that the fool is just a name Anselm gives to 
one who would later be called an atheist, 12 and that 
Anselm's goal is to show the atheist's position to be unten-
able. 
But Flasch's understanding of Anselm's fool is not his 
main reason for thinking that the arguments in the early 
11 Kann Gottes Nicht-Sein gedacht werden?, trans. Burkhard 
Mojsisch and intro. Kurt Flasch, (Mainz: Dieterich, 1989), 7: 
"Freilich gebrauchte er nicht das Wort 'Atheismus,' das erst 
gegen 1600 in Umlauf kam. Aber er bezeichnete klar die 
Position, die er argumentierend als widersprlichlich erweisen 
wollte: die Bestreitung der Existenz eines Wesens, 'liber das 
hinaus Vollkommeneres nicht gedacht werden kann.'" 
12 Ibid., 9. 
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chapters are attempts to prove the existence of God. More 
decisive for him is the character of Anselm's exchange with 
Gaunilo. 13 Flasch points out, first, that Gaunilo seems to 
aim only to show that Anselm has not proven the existence of 
God and, then, that Anselm responds not by claiming that 
Gaunilo has misunderstood him, but by addressing Gaunilo's 
case point by point. 14 Flasch implies that if Anselm had 
intended anything but a proof of the existence of God, he 
could have avoided Gaunilo's attack entirely by insisting 
that Gaunilo had missed the point. Anselm did not do so. He 
must, Flasch concludes, have intended a proof that God 
exists. The book's composition as a prayer is, according to 
Flasch, a "stylization" (Stilisierung). He writes, "If one 
reads the Proslogion in the context of the discussion be-
tween Anselm and Gaunilo, the religious stylization present 
in the text reveals itself as just that: a stylization." 15 
13 The exchange between Anselm and Gaunilo is, in Flasch' s 
view, so decisive that the edition of the Proslogion that he 
introduces contains only the second and third chapters and 
this exchange. He and Mojsisch do not even include the rest of 
the work. 
14 Ibid. , 21: "Niemals aber antwortet Anselm, Gaunilo habe 
ihn miflverstanden; er, Anselm, habe gar nicht beweisen, 
sondern Uber den Glauben meditieren oder zu einer vertieften 
Gotteserfahrung hinflihren wollen." 
We will examine the positions that Flasch here rejects 
later. For now, it is enough to suggest that he is most likely 
thinking of Karl Barth in the first case and Anselm Stolz in 
the second. 
15 Ibid., 12: "Die religiose Stilisierung, die im Text des 
Proslogion vorliegt, erweist sich, liest man sie im Kontext 
der Gaunilo-Anselm-Diskussion, als--Stilisierung eben." 
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I will eventually reject the grounds for trying to 
understand the Proslogion as an attempt to prove the exis-
tence of God. They are, however, reason enough for beginning 
to consider the book that way, and it is not hard to know 
where to start. Anselm discusses God's existence most ex-
plicitly in two chapters, the second.and the third. Let us 
now turn to the argument or arguments that he makes. 
In the second chapter, Anselm identifies God as "that 
than which a greater cannot be thought, " 16 and argues that 
such a one must at least be in the understanding, because 
the words, when spoken, are understood. He then asks whether 
that than which a greater cannot be thought could be solely 
in the understanding, and he answers that it could not. He 
reasons that a being is greater if it is in fact (in re) 
than if it is only in the understanding. Since that than 
which a greater cannot be thought can be thought to be in 
fact, he deduces that if it were to be in the understanding 
alone, then a being greater than it--one thought to be in 
fact--would be thinkable. Therefore, that than which a 
greater cannot be thought must be in fact, and God must 
necessarily be. 17 
16 Anselm, 101: "Et quidem credimus te esse aliquid quo 
nihil maius cogitari possit." 
17 What Anselm literally concludes is that "something than 
which a greater cannot be thought exists, beyond doubt, both 
in the understanding and in fact." Anselm, 102: "Existit ergo 
procul dubio aliquid quo maius cogitari non valet, et 
intellectu et in re." 
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So ends Chapter 2, but as if that were not enough, 
Anselm goes on to argue in Chapter 3 that the non-being of 
God is not only impossible, but unthi.nkable. He argues that 
something can be thought to be that is so great that it does 
not admit of being thought not to be. This, he claims, would 
be greater than something that can be thought not to be. 
Thus, that than which a greater cannot be thought must be 
such that it cannot even be thought not to be. 
These analyses may seem simple, but they have been the 
source of centuries of debate. In order to enter that de-
bate, I shall consider it as it stands now, by looking at 
two authors who have, in very different ways, defended 
versions of the argument recently. 18 They are Norman Malcolm 
and Alvin Plantinga. 
Malcolm's position is that Anselm sets out, in the 
second and third chapters of the Proslogion, two distin-
guishable "pieces of reasoning" for the conclusion that God 
exists, and that one and only one of the "pieces" is a 
rigorous argument. 19 He claims that by means of the first 
argument, the one in Chapter 2, Anselm aims to show that God 
18 For an outstanding analysis of the whole history of 
defenses and rejections of versions of Anselm's argument see: 
Charles Hartshorne, Anselm's Discovery, (La Salle, IL: Open 
Court, 1965), Part Two: A Critical Survey of Responses to 
Anselm's Proof. 
19 Norman Malcolm, "Anselm's Ontological Arguments," The 
Philosophical Review 69 (1960), reprinted in Alvin Plantinga, 
ed. , The Ontological Argument, (Garden City: Anchor Books, 
1965), 136. Page numbers refer to those in Plantinga's book. 
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exists by showing that "something a greater than which 
cannot be conceived" exists. He believes that Anselm aims in 
Chapter 3 to show that God exists by showing that such a 
being necessarily exists. 
I shall consider Malcolm's versions of each of these 
arguments in its turn. His version of the first can be put 
as follows: 
O. God is something a greater than which cannot be 
conceived. 
1. Something a greater than which cannot be conceived 
exists in the understanding. 
2. What exists in the understanding can be conceived to 
exist in reality. 
3. To exist in reality as well as in the understanding 
is greater than to exist solely in the understanding. 
4. Something a greater than which cannot be conceived 
must exist in reality. 
5. God must exist in reality. 20 
I should also consider the arguments for the steps in 
this proof. Malcolm takes 0. as a "definition" of "God." As 
Anselm's evidence for 1., Malcolm claims that: 
Even the fool of the Psalm who says that there is no 
God, when he hears this very thing that Anselm says, 
namely, "something a greater than which cannot be con-
ceived," understands what he hears, and what he under-
stands is in his understanding though he does not under-
stand that it exists. 21 
Malcolm goes on to explain this by saying that, for Anselm, 
to be understood and to be in the understanding are the same 
thing, that Anselm "uses intelligitur and in intellectu est 
20 Ibid., 137-8. 
21 Ibid. 
as interchangeable locutions." 22 To say that a being is in 
the understanding, then, is to say that words that express 
what that being is are understood. 
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Malcolm does not argue for 2, though he does suggest an 
explanation: "Of course many things may exist in the under-
standing that do not exist in reality; for example, 
elves. " 23 
He considers 3. at some length, and points out that 
Anselm deduces 4. from the steps that precede it. He finally 
rejects 3., and we should consider why. He claims that a 
doctrine that existence is a perfection underlies Anselm's 
position, and he rejects this doctrine. He offers the fol-
lowing expression of the doctrine: "An equivalent way of 
putting this interesting proposition, in more current termi-
nology, is: something is greater if it is both conceived of 
and exists than if it is merely conceived of. " 24 Malcolm 
first finds this doctrine "remarkably queer, " 25 and eventu-
ally finds it "false. " 26 He explains the former claim with 
an example, "A king might desire that his next chancellor 
should have knowledge, wit, and resolution; but it is ludi-
crous to add that the king's desire is to have a chancellor 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid., 137. 
24 Ibid., 138. 
25 Ibid., 139. 
26 Ibid., 140. 
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who exists. " 27 
Malcolm concludes that existence, far from being a 
perfection, is not a quality, or predicate, at all, and he 
claims that his own position is nothing but a restatement of 
a point made by Kant. 28 He finally admits, however, that he 
himself has no argument beyond what Kant has already of-
fered. "It would be desirable," he writes, "to have a rigor-
ous refutation of the doctrine but I have not been able to 
provide one. I am compelled to leave the matter at the more 
or less intuitive level of Kant's refutation." 29 
But even if modesty leads Malcolm to refer to Kant, we 
should notice that his position is no mere appeal to author-
ity. We can sense this if we pause to consider the strange 
language Malcolm uses in rejecting the claim that existence 
is a p~rfection. He writes, as I mentioned, that he finds it 
"remarkably queer, " and he proceeds to show with examples 
how queer it is. When Malcolm points out how strange it 
would be for a king to desire a chancellor who exists, he is 
pointing out that we simply do not speak that way. He is not 
denying that a king presented with that odd choice would 
prefer an existent chancellor. He is saying that to treat 
27 Ibid., 139. 
28 For Kant's argument, see: The Critique of Pure Reason, 
Second Division, Chapter 3, Section 4: The Impossibility of an 
Ontological Proof of the Existence of God. We will consider 
some aspects of Kant's position later. 
29 Malcolm, 140. 
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existence as a desirable quality, or possible perfection, 
violates our ordinary use of language. When he points to 
Kant, he is not deferring to him as to an authority. He is 
merely saying that his own argument by examples leaves the 
matter more or less where Kant's example of 100 thalers 
does. 
With this admission, Malcolm turns to the second "piece 
of reasoning," but we should not follow him before consider-
ing ourselves where his position leaves the first version of 
the argument. Let us go straight to the position Kant takes. 
His "intuitive" refutation has not persuaded everyone. Alvin 
Plantinga, for example, rejects Kant's position. He writes 
that "it is very_ doubtful that Kant specified a sense of 'is 
a predicate' such that, in that sense, it is clear both that 
existence is not a predicate and that Anselm's argument 
requires that it be one. 30 
We should sketch Plantinga's claim. He first describes 
what it means for concepts to be equivalent, discussing two 
possible concepts of the Taj Mahal. He labels them Cl and 
C3. He defines Cl as the whole concept of the Taj Mahal. By 
this he means the concept that is entirely adequate to its 
object. In his words, the "whole concept" is "the concept 
whose content includes all (and only) the properties the 
30 Alvin Plantinga, God and Other Minds, (Ithaca: Cornell 
Univ. Press, 1967), 27. 
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object in question has." 31 C3 is "the whole concept of the 
Taj Mahal diminished with respect to existence. " 32 As odd as 
Plantinga's use of the word "diminished" might be, what he 
means is clear enough. In order for the whole concept of the 
Taj Mahal to be adequate to its object, the Taj Mahal it-
self, it must include the existence of the building as an 
attribute of the building. To say that the concept has been 
"diminished" with respect to an attribute is only to say 
that the attribute in question is not predicated of the 
concept. 
Plantinga then claims that for Kant to argue that 100 
real thalers are no more than 100 imagined ones amounts to a 
claim that Cl and C3 are "equivalent concepts, " 33 but he 
does not judge whether Kant's claim about thalers is cor-
rect. Instead, he insists that it is not relevant. It is 
possible, he says, to argue that God must be even without 
assuming--as Malcolm claims Anselm's first argument does--
that existence is a predicate. As Plantinga puts it: 
Anselm maintains that the concept the being than which 
none greater can be conceived is necessarily exempli-
fied; that this is so is in no way inconsistent with the 
suggestion that the whole concept of a thing diminished 
with respect to existence is equivalent to the undimin-
ished whole concept of that thing. Anselm argues that 
the proposition God exists is necessarily true; but 
neither this claim nor his argument for it entails or 
presupposes that existence is a predicate in the sense 
31 Ibid., 35. 
32 Ibid., 35. 
33 Ibid., 36. 
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just explained. 34 
He claims, in other words, that Anselm could insist that 
God must be even without thinking that to do so adds to his 
concept of God. Plantinga explains his claim by arguing that 
it is one thing to claim that God exists, quite another to 
claim that God necessarily exists. He thinks that Anselm's 
argument can and.does suppose that necessary existence is a 
predicate without supposing that mere existence is one. Let 
me note: we shall see that this is precisely the tack taken 
by Malcolm in his "second piece of reasoning." 
Plantinga reports, however, that Kant takes a different 
view. Kant does not think "God exists" could be necessarily 
true. He writes: 
If, in an identical proposition, I reject the predicate 
while retaining the subject, contradiction results; and 
I therefore say that the former belongs necessarily to 
the latter. But if we reject subject and predicate 
alike, there is no contradiction; for nothing is then 
left that can be contradicted. 35 
Kant seems to claim that, even if there is an argument that 
we cannot posit ''God" without positing "exists", we might 
still be able to deny "God," because it is only once we have 
posited "God" that "exists" becomes necessary. When we deny 
"God," nothing remains to which "exists" necessarily be-
longs. 
Anselm's argument, however, explicitly calls into ques-
34 Ibid., 36 
35 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, tr. Norman Kemp 
Smith, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965), 502. 
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tion whether his interlocutor can deny "God." The first 
point he makes about the fool is that when the fool hears 
"that than which none greater can be thought," he under-
stands what he hears. Anselm infers from this that such a 
being is in the understanding--even in the fool's under-
standing--even if the fool does not understand such a being 
to be. Anselm thus concludes, and does not merely assert, 
that God is in the understanding. What he takes to be an 
established f act--that even the fool understands--becomes 
his evidence that God is in the fool's understanding at 
least. He then uses this conclusion to show that God must 
be. If we could simply deny "God," as Kant asserts we can, 
there might indeed be nothing for the denial of the exis-
tence of God to contradict. But neither Anselm nor his fool 
can do so. In the face of Anselm's evidence to the contrary, 
Kant must show the possibility of such a denial, and this he 
does not do. 
For all this, it is enough to note right now that the 
fact that Plantinga argues against Kant at some length 
establishes at the very least that Kant's position does not 
appeal to everyone as it appeals to Malcolm. Even if 
Malcolm's Kantian refutation is correct, it has not persuad-
ed all. Even so, if we assume that Malcolm's Kantian rejec-
tion of Anselm's first argument is inadequate we still need 
not accept the first argument. As I already suggested, there 
are issues concerning the possibility of God's existence 
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that the argument leaves unanswered. I shall address these 
as I consider what Malcolm takes to be Anselm's second 
argument. 
Let us turn to it now. His way of construing what he 
calls Anselm's "second ontological argument" 36 can be summa-
rized as follows: 
O. God is a being than which a greater cannot be con-
ceived. 
1. A being whose non-existence is logically impossible 
can be conceived. 
2. Such a being is greater than a being whose non-exis-
tence is logically possible. 
3. God's non-existence must be logically impossible. 
I shall again consider each step. Though Malcolm gave no 
explanation of O. in the first version of the argument, he 
does so here by affirming that it is in line with one use of 
the word "God." He writes: 
There certainly is A use of the word "God," and I think 
far the more common use, in accordance with which the 
statements "God is the greatest of all beings," "God is 
the most perfect being," "God is the supreme being," are 
logically necessary truths, in the same sense that the 
statement "A square has four sides" is a logically 
necessary truth. 37 
For Malcolm, Anselm's "definition" is equivalent to these 
statements, which are "logically necessary truths," in as 
much as this is what is most often meant by "God." 
Malcolm has the most to say about 2. He explains in some 
detail how he understands Anselm's use of "greater." He 
understands Anselm's claim here to be different from the 
36 Plantinga, The Ontological Argument, 141. 
37 Ibid. I 141. 
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claim Anselm makes in the first argument. There, Malcolm had 
interpreted Anselm's use of "greater" to be a reflection of 
the claim that existence is a perfection. Here, Malcolm 
argues that Anselm's claim is that necessary existence is a 
perfection. 
Malcolm rejected the claim about existence by appealing 
to an example illustrating how we usually speak. He accepts 
the claim about necessary existence in much the same way. To 
this end he discusses what he calls "the notion of depen-
dance, " 38 arguing that, "If we reflect on the common meaning 
of the word 'God', ••. we realize that it is incompatible 
with this meaning that God's existence should depend on any-
thing. "39 He goes on to explain that our conception of God 
as an unlimited being includes more than just unlimited 
power. It also includes unlimited existence. God's being 
cannot depend on anything, and nothing can prevent God from 
being. According to Malcolm, this is what Anselm's defini-
tion of God means: 
God is usually conceived of as an unlimited being. He is 
conceived of as a being who could not be limited, that 
is, as an absolutely unlimited being. This is no less 
than to conceive of Him as something a greater than 
which cannot be conceived. If God is conceived to be an 
absolutely unlimited being He must be conceived to be 
unlimited in regard to His existence as well as His 
operation. In this conception it will not make sense to 
say that He depends on anything for coming into or 
continuing in existence. Nor, as Spinoza observed, will 
it make any sense to say that something could prevent 
38 Ibid., 143. 
39 Ibid. 
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Him from existing. 40 
Malcolm thus excludes two possibilities: nothing could 
prevent God from coming to be, and nothing could remove God 
from being. 
Malcolm suggests, however, that there is one more possi-
bility: God might just happen not to be. Even if no reason 
can be given for God's not being, even if that non-being 
cannot be thought, God might not exist. It might appear, 
after all, that the existence of God and our power to think 
that existence are distinct issues. So too for God's non-
existence and our inability to think it. Perhaps God does 
not exist even though that non-existence cannot be thought. 
Malcolm anticipates this objection, and he rejects it. 
He argues that God could "just happen" not to exist only if 
God's non-existence were possible and that, if it were 
possible that God should just happen not to exist, then, 
even if God did exist, God's non-existence would be think-
able--at least in the sense that we could ask meaningful 
questions about it. This is to say th.at the possibility that 
God might not exist entails that God's non-existence is 
thinkable. Malcolm explains that: 
from the supposition that it could happen that God did 
not exist it would follow that, if He existed, He would 
have mere duration and not eternity. It would make sense 
to ask, "How long has he existed?," "Will He exist next 
week?," "He was in existence yesterday but how about 
today?," and so on. It seems absurd to make God the 
40 Ibid., 143-4. 
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subject of such questions. 41 
Malcolm insists that our ordinary conception of God, a 
conception captured in Anselm's turn of phrase, is of a God 
not merely of unlimited duration, but of God eternal and 
necessarily eternal. Questions about God's supposed duration 
do not suggest merely falsely that there could be a limit to 
that duration. They do so meaninglessly. The suggestion that 
God just happens to exist eternally is, he thinks, likewise 
meaningless. 
To Malcolm, all this means that no contingent existence 
can be ascribed to God, that the existence of God is either 
necessary or impossible, and he cites the following passage 
from Anselm's response to Gaunilo to show that Anselm 
agrees: 
If indeed [that than which a greater cannot be thought] 
can even be thought, it is necessary that it be. For no 
one denying or doubting that there is something than 
which a greater could not be thought denies or doubts 
that, if there were (such a thing], it would not be 
possible that it not be, either in deed or in the under-
standing. Therefore, if it can even be thought, it is 
impossible for that than which a greater cannot be 
thought not to be. 42 
41 Ibid., 144. 
42 Anselm, 131: "Si utique vel cogitari potest, necesse 
est illud esse. Nullus enim negans aut dubitans esse aliquid 
quo maius cogitari non possit, negat vet dubitat quia, si 
esset, nee actu nee intellectu posset non esse. Aliter namque 
non esset quo maius cogitari non posset. Sed quidquid cogitari 
potest et non esse: si esset posset vel actu vel intellectu 
non esse. Quare si vel cogitari potest, non potest non esse 
"quo maius cogitari nequit". 
Malcolm himself cites Deane's translation (St. Anselm: 
Basic Writings, 154-5): "If it [the thing a greater than which 
cannot be conceived] can be conceived at all it must exist. 
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Malcolm concludes that the only possible basis for rejecting 
the existence of· God would be to argue that a being than 
which none greater can be conceived is impossible. 43 
He discusses the question of God's possibility, but his 
main point is not an argument that God is, or must be, 
possible. Instead, he argues that it would be wrong to ask 
for such an argument. It would be, in his terms, to demand a 
proof that the concept of a being than which none greater 
can be conceived does not contradict itself, and he holds 
that such a demand would be unreasonable. He explains: 
With respect to any particular reasoning that is offered 
for holding that the concept of seeing a material thing, 
for example, is self-contradictory, one may try to show 
the invalidity of the reasoning and thus free the con-
cept from the charge of being self-contradictory on that 
ground. But I do not understand what it would mean to 
demonstrate in general, and not in respect to any par-
ticular reasoning, that the concept is not self-contra-
dictory. So it is with the concept of God. I should 
think there is no more of a presumption that it is self-
contradictory than is the concept of seeing a material 
thing. 44 
Malcolm speaks here of a "presumption." In the face of 
the fact that many of us do speak of God with a sense that 
For no one who denies or doubts the existence of a being a 
greater than which in inconceivable, denies or doubts that if 
it did exist its non-existence, either in reality or in the 
understanding, would be impossible. For otherwise it would not 
be a being a greater than which cannot be conceived. But as to 
whatever can be conceived but does not exist: if it were to 
exist its non-existence either in reality or in the under-
standing would be possible. Therefore, if a being a greater 
than which cannot be conceived, can even be conceived, it must 
exist." 
43 Malcolm, 145. 
44 Ibid., 157. 
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we are speaking of something real, we are right to assume 
that God is possible. There is, he thinks, no particular 
reason to assume that God cannot be rather than that God can 
be. Those of us who speak of God can rightly be asked to 
refute any particular argument that purports to show that 
God is impossible. We cannot be expected, however, to do any 
more than that. 
Nevertheless, insofar as Malcolm's ordinary language 
version of the ontological argument for the existence of God 
can show, by itself, only that if God is possible, then God 
must be, it cannot show us that God is without showing us 
that. God can be. If Malcolm is right to say that there are 
no general arguments for the possibility of a thing--or, as 
he would say, the non-contradictory character of a concept--
then there can, on his account, be no general argument that 
God can be, and so is. We may feel a presumption one way or 
the other, but a presumption is not a proof. To say this is 
in no way to conclude that Malcolm's version of the argument 
is invalid. Or even that it is weak. It is only to affirm 
that the argument, even as he construes it, is limited. 
Plantinga concludes as much in a rather different way. 
He does not believe that there are conclusive general argu-
ments for the existence or non-existence of God, but he 
makes no general appeal to the way people speak. Instead, he 
concludes that the belief that God exists can be "properly 
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basic" for the individuals who hold it. 45 This is to say 
that there are circumstances under which it is reasonable 
for a given individual to hold that God exists, even if such 
circumstances are at play only for that individual. He 
writes, "There are therefore many conditions and circum-
stances that call forth belief in God: guilt, gratitude, 
danger, a sense of God's presence, a sense that he speaks, 
perception of various parts of the universe. " 46 Such circum-
stances might lead to certain beliefs--he points, for exam-
ple, to a belief that one is guilty before God and a belief 
that God is to be thanked. Though he must immediately admit 
that it is these beliefs that are "properly basic," and not 
the belief that God exists, he also adds that "each self-
evidently entails that God exists. " 47 
But this whole claim arises out of a conclusion that 
general arguments for and against existence are inconclu-
sive. To say that whether it is reasonable for someone to 
believe in God depends on circumstances such as Plantinga 
points to is to say that the argument between men such as 
Malcolm and Findlay, who argues that God is impossible, 48 
45 Alvin Plantinga, "Is Belief in God Properly Basic?", 
Nous, March 1981, 41-53. 
46 Ibid., 46. 
47 Ibid., 47. 
48 J.N. Findlay, Language, Truth and Value, (NewYork: The 
Humanities Press, 1963), reprinted in Plantinga, The Ontologi-
cal Argument. 
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may be no argument at all. If Malcolm has some reason, per-
haps an experience, that leads him to think that God is it 
is perfectly reasonable for him to believe it. In the ab-
sence of such evidence, Findlay is just as reasonable to 
think otherwise. But neither has any basis from which to 
refute the other's position. The two of them have little to 
discuss at all. 
Plantinga's account stands thus, in one sense, in sharp 
contrast with Malcolm's. The latter attempts to enable us to 
discuss God's possibility by investigating the way we ordi-
narily speak about God. Someone who would deny that God is 
possible must accept the burden of undermining the presump-
tion, grounded in the way we ordinarily speak, that God 
might be. For Plantinga, such a discussion would be beside 
the point. The basis on which the question of God's exis-
tence must be decided is a private one. I reflect upon my 
own experience. I ask myself whether any experience I have 
entails a properly basic belief that God exists. 
Thus, if my account can serve as a representative sample 
of the current attempts to defend the rigor of what is taken 
to be Anselm's argument for the existence of God, I must 
conclude that those attempts fall short of establishing that 
God exists because they cannot show that God is possible. 
This does not mean that they are invalid, or even that they 
are weak, but that they are limited. Malcolm and Plantinga 
each go outside of the argument to justify their different 
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manners of concluding that God indeed exists. Malcolm turns 
to the ordinary use of the word "God." Plantinga appeals to 
private experience. By itself, the investigation of the 
ontological argument may thus be a complex and interesting 
road, but if it is to show that God exists, it also seems to 
be a dead end. My question, then, must be whether this dead 
end is Anselm's road as well. 
CHAPTER 3 
ANSELM'S ARGUMENT FROM EXPERIENCE 
In the first chapter I argued that modern analytic 
versions of Anselm's argument are not compelling proofs that 
God exists. Both of the versions we considered require an 
appeal to experience in order to ground the assumption, 
otherwise open to question, that God is possible. In consid-
ering the versions of Malcolm and Plantinga, I paid little 
attention to any question of fidelity to what Anselm himself 
actually says. I did not ask whether the Proslogion includes 
an ontological argument for God's existence. Instead I 
focussed on the analyses of current versions of what has 
come to be called the ontological argument. We must decide 
whether my conclusions concerning those modern arguments are 
valid for Anselm's position as well. I will argue that 
insofar as analytic versions of the argument lead to an 
appeal to experience, they are similar to the argument 
Anselm himself makes. The difference, however, lies in the 
character of the claim that Anselm's own argument strives to 
make. It is not a claim about God's existence, but a claim 
about God's being. The analytic debate about the ontological 
argument for the existence of God comes to a dead end at the 
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question of God's possibility, but Anselm's own argument is 
another road entirely. 
Some recent commentators have already rejected the 
common assumption that Anselm offers an ontological argument 
for the existence of God. We will have reason to consider 
one such rejection, by Jean-Luc Marion, at some length in 
Chapter 5. Thomas Losoncy, however, has also argued that 
Anselm presents no such argument. He argues that it is 
Gaunilo who formulates the ontological argument and that 
Anselm explicitly rejects that formulation in his response 
to Gaunilo. 1 Gregory Schufreider allows that Anselm's argu-
ment is ontological, but insists that it is less about the 
fact of God's existence than about the manner of God's 
existence. 2 
One striking point is that although the current analytic 
debate, and indeed much of the debate since Leibniz and even 
Scotus, leads to the question of God's possibility, this 
question is entirely absent from Anselm's book. This fact 
has not struck all readers, and perhaps for good reason. 
Analytic writers like Malcolm and Plantinga see the issue of 
God's possibility in Anselm's various claims about conceiv-
ability. Plantinga, for example, writes that: 
1 Thomas A. Losconcy, "Saint Anselm' s Rejection of the 
'Ontological Argument'--A Review of the Occasion and Circum-
stances," The American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, 64 
(1990): 373-85 •. 
2 Gregory Schufreider, Confessions of a Rational Mystic, 
(West Lafayette, IN: Purdue Univ. Press, 1994). 
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when Anselm defines "God" as "the being than which none 
greater can be conceived," I think we can represent his 
intent by replacing that phrase with "the being than 
which it is not (logically) possible that there be a 
greater" or "the greatest possible being." 3 
And in a later book, he writes that when Anselm says, "that 
a certain state of affairs is conceivable he means to say 
(or so, at any rate, I shall take him) that it is a logical-
ly possible state of affairs." 4 It is only fair to add that 
Plantinga notes that he is less interested in representing 
Anselm's argument faithfully than in working out arguments 
that Anselm's "words suggest." 5 Even if expressions like 
"state of affairs" and "conceivable" are foreign to Anselm's 
work, it would be enough for Plantinga if they express an 
argument worth talking about. Plantinga cares about the 
logic of a certain collection of claims, not about the 
meaning of Anselm's words. 
It is important for us to note that when Plantinga 
writes of logical possibility, what he has in mind is the 
absence of contradiction. In The Nature of Necessity, he 
explains what he means by a "possible state of affairs" by 
mentioning counter-examples: 
So, for example, Kareem Abdul-Jabbar's being more than 
seven feet tall is a state of affairs, as is Spiro 
Aanew's beina President of Yale University. Although 
each of these is a state of affairs, the former but not 
3 Plantinga, God and Other Minds, 65. 
4 Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity, (Oxford: Oxford 
Univ. Press, 1974), 199. 
5 Ibid., 199. 
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the latter obtains, or is actual. And although the 
latter is not actual, it is a possible state of affairs; 
in this regard it differs from David's having travelled 
faster than the speed of light and Paul's having squared 
the circle. The former of these last two items is caus-
ally or naturally impossible; the latter is impossible 
in that broadly logical sense. 6 
Plantinga's example of something logically impossible is 
the squaring of a circle, the self-contradictory effort to 
find a square equal in area to a given circle. A logically 
possible state of affairs is, presumably, one that entails 
no such contradiction. Let us remember that we already saw 
that Malcolm thinks of possibility in the same way. In order 
to suggest that there can be no general proof that something 
is possible, he writes that although he might be able to 
refute any particular claim that a given concept is self-
contradictory, he does not "understand what it would mean to 
demonstrate in general ••• that the concept is not self 
contradictory." 7 
Anselm could not, however, mean what Plantinga takes him 
to mean. The issue for him is not whether a concept of God 
contradicts itself. He does not speak of whether a state of 
affairs is conceivable, much less whether one is logically 
possible. Anselm speaks of God as a being, not as a state 
of affairs, than which nothing greater can be thought. And 
this is not the same as saying that God is the greatest 
logically possible being. When Anselm says that God is a 
6 Ibid., 44. 
7 Malcolm, 157. 
being than which nothing greater can be thought, he is 
speaking both of the greatness of God and our power to 
think. The evidence for this emerges in Chapter 15 of the 
Proslogion. There, Anselm argues that God is not only that 
than which a greater cannot be thought, or conceived, but 
that God is "something greater than could be thought." 8 
45 
According to Plantinga's understanding, Anselm would here be 
arguing that God is so great as not to be logically possi-
ble. 
Now, in the first place, it is hard to imagine what it 
would mean to say that logical impossibility should be a 
feature of God's greatness. It might not be strange to say 
that God's greatness is miraculous, but is "miraculous" even 
a near synonym for "logically impossible?" In addition, 
Anselm immediately goes on to argue that such a being can be 
thought to be. Is it likely that he means it is logically 
possible that there be a being that is logically impossible? 
Let us, then, attempt to interpret Anselm's own argu-
ment. I will claim that it leads farther than the modern 
debate about the ontological argument can. We can begin by 
asking why the possibility of God's existence would not come 
into question for Anselm. It might be tempting to think that 
ignoring the question reflects a lack of rigor in Anselm's 
thinking, but this is not the case. We can start to under-
8 Anselm, 112: "quiddam maius quam cogitari possit." 
There will be a lot to say about this chapter. 
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stand why Anselm would not have considered whether God is 
possible by taking Anselm's original title for the work 
seriously. 
He reports that he first called the book "Faith Seeking 
Understanding," 9 as if the title itself should emphasize 
that the book is a search of and within faith for under-
standing--and not the search of a disinterested inquirer. 
Anselm underscores this fact about the book at the end of 
Chapter 1, where he insists that he does not seek to under-
stand in order to believe, but rather believes in order to 
understand, and he explains by adding, "For this too I 
believe: that unless I believe, I shall not understand." 10 
In fact, much of the first chapter reflects its author's 
sense that the undertaking that is to follow depends upon 
his relationship with God. He exhorts the little man who he 
is to "be free for a little while for God and rest for a 
little while in Him." 11 This is to say that he must attend, 
for the moment, to God alone. He exhorts his own heart to 
beseech God: "Speak now, all my heart, say now to God, 'I 
9 Ibid., 94: " ••• nee tamen eadem sine aliquo titulo, quo 
aliquem, in cuius manus venirent, quodam modo ad se legendum 
invitarent, dimittenda putabam: unicuique suum dedi titulum, 
ut prius Exemplum meditandi de ratione fidei, et sequens Fides 
quaerens intellectum diceretur." The work that he refers to as 
"the former" is the Monologion. 
10 Ibid., 100: "Nam et hoc credo: quia nisi credidero, non 
intelligam." 
11 Ibid., 97: "Vaca aliquantulum Deo, et requiesce 
aliquantulum in eo." 
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seek Your face; Your face, Lord, I am searching for.' " 12 
This suggests that it is not enough to attend to God. Anselm 
must speak to God and ask for help. Anselm then addresses 
God directly, "Then come You now, Lord my God, teach my 
heart, where and how it might seek You, where and how it 
might find You." 13 Each of these moments--and there are 
others in the first chapter--reflects the role that Anselm's 
faith, his relationship with God, plays from the very start 
of the book • What is important to remember here is that for 
Anselm to begin by confessing his belief in God is not 
merely to report his acceptance of a body of statements 
about God, among which is the claim that God exists. 
Anselm's starting point is not the words of a dogma, but the 
experience of a presence, God's presence. 
The beginning of the book reflects this fact in many 
ways, but the reflection does have one characteristic form: 
throughout much of the beginning Anselm speaks directly to 
God. God is not merely the subject of a discourse, but the 
object of an address. After directing a few words to his own 
soul, Anselm spends most of the first chapter asking God for 
help and explaining to God why he needs it. The second 
chapter, where the argument concerning God's being first 
12 Ibid.: "Die nunc, totum cor meum, die nunc Deo: Quaero 
vultum tuum, vultum tuum, Domine, requiro." 
13 Ibid., 98: "Eia nunc ergo tu, Domine Deus meus, doce 
cor meum, ubi et quomodo te quaerat, ubi et quomodo te 
inveniat." 
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emerges, opens with yet more words addressed to God. Before 
his analysis begins, Anselm briefly summarizes his plea for 
help, "Therefore, Lord, who grants understanding to faith, 
grant to me, as much as You know that it will profit, that I 
understand that You are just as we believe and that You are 
what we believe. " 14 
The first thing to note is that Anselm considers his 
request to be a consequence of the profession that precedes 
it. The chapter's first word, "ergo" (therefore), marks it 
as such. He has just written that he will not understand 
without first believing. Because he believes that under-
standing can only follow faith, and that God is one who 
grants the former to the latter, he must begin his search 
for understanding by asking for it. 
He directs this request to God. It is directed speech. 
The chapter's second word is in the vocative case, the form 
of direct address. The sentence's main verb, "grant" (da), 
is a second person imperative. It may be tempting to assume 
that Anselm must address God merely because he believes he 
must ask for understanding. As such it would reflect 
Anselm's need, but not necessarily any sense, on Anselm's 
part, of the presence of one who might meet that need. 
The assumption, however, would be false. The intimate 
tone of the first chapter argues against this. In addition, 
14 Anselm, 101: "Ergo Domine, qui das fidei intellectum, 
da mihi, ut quantum scis expedire, intelligam, quia es sicut 
credimus, et hoc es quod credimus." 
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we should recognize that Anselm could ask for help without 
addressing God directly. One way to see this is to compare 
the beginning of the Proslogion with another work that both 
aims at understanding the existence of God and also begins 
in prayer: De primo principio, by John Duns Scotus. 
Scotus begins, "May the First Principle of things grant 
me to believe, to understand and to reveal what may please 
his majesty and may lift up our minds to contemplate him. " 15 
Scotus makes this request of what he calls "the first prin-
ciple of things." He asks that the principle "allow" 
(concedat) him "to believe, know, and present what might 
please its majesty." He follows by asking that something be 
revealed that will lift up "our minds" to contemplation. 
This is just what Anselm at least claims to aim at as he 
writes the Proslogion. He describes the persona in which the 
Proslogion is written as that of "on~ trying to lift up his 
mind towards contemplating God. " 16 
But if the similarity between Anselm's beginning and 
that of Scotus is great, so is the difference. The third 
person, jussive subjunctive that Scotus uses makes it clear 
15 John Duns Scot us, A Treatise on God as First· Principle, 
trans. and ed. by Allan B. Wolter (Chicago: Franciscan Herald, 
1966), 3: "Primum rerum Principium mihi ea credere, sapere, ac 
proferre concedat, quae ipsius placeant maiestati et ad eius 
contemplationem elevent mentes nostras." 
16 Anselm, 94: " ••• sub persona conantis erigere mentem 
suam ad contemplandum Deum ••• " 
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that he does not address anyone in particular. He speaks of, 
and not to, the one on whom his request depends. Whereas 
Anselm speaks to the God from whom he hopes for assistance, 
Scotus speaks only of the first principle and of our minds. 
Anselm, then, need not address God simply because his 
hope depends on God. He speaks to God because God is there 
for him to speak to--felt as present before an argument for 
God's existence is made--and he speaks to God because God's 
presence is fundamental to the analysis that follows his 
first words. In order to understand his analysis, one must 
understand the role God's presence plays in it. 
In the sentence that follows Anselm's request for help, 
the sentence with which Anselm's analysis of God's being 
begins, he only confirms that the analysis requires the 
presence of God at the very start. Like the words that 
precede them, the words with which Anselm articulates what 
has been called his "definition" of God are also addressed 
to God. Anselm writes, "And indeed we believe You to be 
something than which nothing greater could be thought. " 17 
Here again, we see Anselm's reliance on God reflected in two 
ways: on one hand, he affirms that the analysis is about 
what he--or, as he says, what we--believe; on the other 
hand, it is a belief expressed to God, who is there. 
Anselm concludes his first analysis of the being of God 
17 Ibid., 101: "Et quidem credimus te esse aliquid quo 
nihil maius cogitari possit." 
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midway through Chapter Three, "Therefore, so truly is there 
something than which a greater cannot be thought that it 
could not even be thought not to be. " 18 He adds: "And this 
is You, Lord our God." And he goes on to explain the conclu-
sion he has reached in a manner that shows the same two 
aspects. He addresses it to God, whom he has spoken of, and 
he explains it in terms of what he believes about God: 
Therefore, You are so truly, Lord my God, that You could 
not even be thought not to be. And rightly. For if any 
mind could think something better than You, the creature 
would ascend above the creator and would pronounce 
judgment on the creator; which is very absurd. 19 
Anselm re-affirms, by use of the second person, the connec-
tion between his analysis and the presence of God, and he 
explains his conclusion in terms of a belief about God that 
is not expressed~-though it might be implied--by the state-
ment to and about God that begins the analysis: Anselm 
refers to God as the creator. If it were Anselm's intention 
to prove the existence of God by reason alone, without 
reference to the beliefs about God that he starts with, this 
explanation would make no sense whatsoever. By referring to 
God, at this point, as the creator, Anselm goes beyond any 
set of premises that the ontological argument would start 
with, and he does so gratuitously, since the argument has 
18 Ibid., 103: "Sic ergo vere est aliquid quo maius 
cogitari non potest, ut nee cogitari possit non esse." 
19 Ibid.: Sic ergo vere es, Domine, Deus meus, ut nee 
cogitari possis ·non esse. Et merito. Si enim aliqua mens 
posset cogitare aliquid melius te, ascenderet creatura super 
creatorem et judicaret de creatore; quod valde est absurdum. 
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presumably been made before the return to the second person 
singular that begins this passage. 
The character of the first chapter, of the beginning of 
the second, and of the middle of the third suggests an 
explanation for the fact the Anselm does not discuss the 
question of God's possibility: he need not do so because he 
experiences the presence of the God whom he seeks to under-
stand. Such an experience is just the sort of circumstance 
that Plantinga has in mind when he speaks of circumstances 
that entail a properly basic belief, and in this respect it 
may appear to be similar to his approach. The two appeals to 
experience are, however, quite different. Plantinga appeals, 
as a final step, to the possibility that an experience can 
justify a belief as properly basic in order to preserve the 
claim that the ontological argument can be valid. Anselm, 
however, does not appeal to experience at the end of his 
argument. For him, experience is where the argument begins. 
There is no moment, at the conclusion of the argument, at 
which Anselm must admit that it depends upon a decisive 
appeal to experience, because his experience of God moves 
the argument right from the start. 
We should, however, at least consider the possibility 
that I am making too much of the words in which Anselm 
imbeds his argument. After all, Schmitt gives us serious 
reasons to think that the composition of the Proslogion as a 
prayer is window dressing that was added after the heart of 
the work was conceived. It is important to face his posi-
tion. 
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Schmitt shows that there are clear differences between 
the passages in which Anselm argues and those in which he 
does not. It is, however, important to notice that this 
hardly bears at all on the way of understanding the 
Proslogion that I would suggest. Schmitt's point seems aimed 
at refuting the attempt to deny that the Proslogion is an 
argument at all. This is not my position. Even if I grant 
Schmitt that the argumentative sections of the Proslogion 
are the core that Anselm only later clothed as prayer, I can 
still insist that Anselm's analysis depends on the fact that 
he feels God to be present to him. 
But it is also possible to say more about Schmitt's 
position. Schmitt concludes that Anselm aims only at the 
speculative task of reducing the reasoning in the Monologion 
to a single argument, and that the composition of the work 
as an address is mere style. Even so, he must somehow ex-
plain the style of the work. He might claim that the book's 
composition is incidental to it, but the book is at least 
composed as an address. Fully aware of this, Schmitt asks 
why Anselm might have chosen this particular form, and 
answers that the Monologion was composed as a discourse and 
that, in order to vary his style, Anselm set the Proslogion 
as an address. But Schmitt does not ask why Anselm might 
have wanted to vary his style: he only asks--and this only 
rhetorically--whether any other variation in style would 
have been more likely. 20 Nor does he explain why the style 
Anselm settled on was that of an address to God, though 
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Anselm wrote dialogues and letters as well. For some reason, 
Anselm chose to compose the Proslogion as an address to God. 
One ought to try to understand this fact. To say that this 
was out of a desire for what we might today call a "change 
of pace" is to refuse to take what might be a decisive 
question seriously at all. 
To see that the presence of God, which is affirmed by 
the composition of the work as a prayer, bears strongly on 
the nature of the analysis is to make a beginning. The 
possibility that God exists is established for Anselm by the 
fact that he experiences God. This is not to say that Anselm 
deduces that God is possible from his experience, but that, 
because of his experience, the question of God's possibility 
is not a question for him. Anselm's analysis is, then, an 
argument from experience. To explore this claim requires 
considering the two notions on which the analysis depends. 
We must ask what the verbs "to think" (cogitare) and "to 
understand" (intelligere) express. 
When Anselm writes of something than which none greater 
can be thought, what does "thought" (cogitari) mean? The 
only gesture Anselm makes towards defining the word is by 
20 See Schmitt's introduction to his Latin-German edition 
of the Proslogion, 32, cited above, note 8. 
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way of a metaphor. This he does in the fourth chapter, 
immediately after he has argued in the third that God cannot 
be thought not to be. Referring back to a psalm that he has 
already quoted, Anselm asks, "How then did [the fool] say in 
his heart what he could not think, or how could he not think 
what he said in his heart, when to say in the heart and to 
think are the same? " 21 He explains that something can be 
thought in two ways, "For a thing is thought in one sense, 
when the word signifying it is thought [and], in another, 
when that itself, which the thing is; is understood." 22 
Anselm points to the second meaning as the important one, 
emphasizing that "No one indeed, understanding what God is, 
can think that God is not, although he might say these words 
in his heart. " 23 It is this meaning, then, that must guide 
the attempt to understand what he means by "that than which 
none greater can be thought." Such a being is one than which 
none greater can be spoken of in our hearts with understand-
21 Ibid., 103: "Verum quomodo dixit in corde qoud cogitare 
non potuit; aut quomodo cogitare non potuit quod dixit in 
corde, cum idem sit dicere in corde et cogitare?" 
22 Ibid., 103: :Aliter enim cogitatur res, cum vox 
significans cogitatur, aliter cum id ipsum quod res est 
intelligitur." 
23 Ibid., 103-4: "Nullus quippe intelligens id quod Deus 
est, potest cogitare quia Deus non estj licet haec verba dicat 
in corde ••• " 
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ing. 24 
But this explanation forces one to ask what Anselm means 
by "understanding" (intellectus) and "understand" (intel-
ligere). It is more difficult to talk about these words. Let 
me say at least provisionally that the understanding is a 
kind of vision or is somehow like vision. To do so is to 
respond, once again, to a metaphor Anselm uses. For though 
he speaks of his desire to understand God, he also speaks, 
quoting another psalm, of a desire to see God's face: "I 
seek Your face; [it is] Your face, Lord, I am searching 
for. " 25 The metaphor suggests that to understand something 
is to see it as what it is, that understanding is insight. 
I will later point out that as noted an authority as 
Karl Barth takes the word in a very different sense, but for 
now let me confirm that this initial understanding of under-
standing corresponds to Anselm's own use by turning to his 
Chapter 18. There, he goes farther in the suggestion that 
the activity of understanding is a kind of vision. I cited 
the decisive passage in my introduction, 26 and I shall cite 
it later as well, but let me also do so here. After having 
enumerated qualities that are God, and having summarized 
24 My discussion of Augustine in the introduction can 
serve us here. Augustine describes the attempt to know as the 
struggle to speak one's inner word. This effort may be just 
what Anselm means by "saying in the heart." 
25 Ibid., 97: "Quaero vultum tuum, vultum tuum, Domine, 
requiro." 
26 See above, p. 11. 
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them all by saying that God is "every true good," Anselm 
writes that the qualities "are many," and he adds, "my 
narrow understanding cannot see so many in one simultaneous 
insight in order to delight in all of them at once." 27 
Anselm thus thinks of understanding as a power that sees--or 
fails to see--wholes at once. 
When, therefore, Anselm identifies God as something than 
which nothing greater can be thought, he means that God is 
something than which nothing greater can be spoken of in 
one's heart in a manner that enables one to see it. And when 
he begins his argument by claiming that God is at least in 
the understanding, he must mean that when he tells the fool 
what God is, the fool sees, in some sense, what Anselm is 
talking about. The fool is not an atheist, if to be an 
atheist requires the denial that God is even possible. The 
fool cannot do so: Anselm's claim that the fool understands 
the words with which Anselm expresses what he believes God 
to be requires that the fool sees, or experiences, the 
"thing" (res) those words describe--perhaps very much as 
Anselm does. 
If, then, Anselm's fool is--despite what Flasch would 
claim--no atheist, who is this fool? Several points are 
worth noticing. First, let us consider where Anselm finds 
the fool. It is in the thirteenth psalm. The psalmist begins 
27 Ibid., 114: "Multa sunt haec, non potest angustus 
intellectus meus tot uno simul intuitu videre, ut omnibus 
simul delectetur." 
by proclaiming the line that Anselm quotes: 
The fool hath said in his heart: There is no God. 
They are corrupt, and are become abominable in their 
ways: there is none that doth good, no not one. 
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The Lord looked down from heaven upon the children 
of men, to see if there be any that understand and seek 
God. 
They are all gone aside, they are become unprofit-
able together: there is none that doeth good, no not 
one. 28 
These first three verses affirm the connection between 
the denial that God is and wrongdoing. The fool of whom the 
psalmist sings says in his heart that there is no God, and, 
as a result, is corrupt and has become abominable. At the 
same time, the psalmist also says what the fool is not. The 
fool is not one who "did understand, and seek God." 
At this point it is worth remembering how Anselm de-
scribes the persona he adopts for the Prosloqion. It is 
written, he says, "under the persona of one trying to lift 
up his mind in order to contemplate God and seeking to 
understand what he believes. " 29 As such, it seems written 
with the fool of the psalm in mind. The Proslogion persona 
strives precisely to direct his thoughts towards contemplat-
28 Psalms 13:1-3. This is the translation made from the 
Vulgate at Douay in 1609. The Vulgate itself reads: 
Dixit insipiens in corde suo non est Deus 
corrumpti sunt et abominabiles f acti sunt in studiis suis: 
non est qui f aciat bonum non est usque ad unum: 
Dominus de caelo prospexit super filios hominum 
ut videat si est intelligens aut: requirens Deum 
omnes declinaverunt simul inutiles facti sunt 
non est qui f aciat bonum non est usque ad unum. 
29 Anselm, 93-4: " ••• sub persona conantis erigere mentem 
suam ad contemplandum Deum et quaerentis intelligere quod 
credit ••• " 
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ing God, and seeks in doing so to understand what he be-
lieves. This would be to understand God, an understanding 
denied, according to the psalmist, to the foolish children 
of men. 
But to say that the Proslogion is directed against such 
a fool is not enough. When Anselm says that the persona he 
will assume is of one who seeks to lift the mind to the con-
templation of God, he does not mean someone else's mind, but 
his own (mentem suam). In other words, Anselm's fool is a 
fool within, some part of the author that says in his heart 
that there is no God. 
This is not to say that some part of Anselm doubts the 
existence of God. One way to see this is to consider a 
passage in another psalm, a passage echoed in the reference 
to the fool in Psalm 13. In the ninth psalm, the psalmist 
writes that: 
The sinner has provoked the Lord: according to the 
throng of his anger he does not seek. 
God is not in his sight ••• 30 
Jerome's placing of "non est" in the emphatic first position 
30 This is my own translation of what appears in the 
Vulgate at Psalms 9:4-5. The Vulgate reads: 
"exacerbavit Dominum peccator secundum multitudinem 
irae suae non quaeret 
non est Deus in conspectu eius." 
I do not use the Douay because it loses the passage that 
the thirteenth Psalm echoes. Instead of translating "non est 
Deus" as "there is no God" it renders it as "God is not." In 
the Douay, the passage reads as follows: 
"The sinner hath provoked the Lord, according to the 
multitude of his wrath he will not seek him: 
God is not before his eyes ••• " 
60 
in the Vulgate argues that God is entirely absent from the 
wicked man's sight. The wicked man fails to see God at all. 
God is not present to him. 
But this is not the case with the fool--neither Anselm's 
fool nor the fool of the psalm. God is present in the fool's 
thoughts. The fool is a fool because he denies the existence 
of God even though God is present to him. Anselm uses this 
presence almost right away as his analysis proceeds: this 
much I have already argued. The wicked man of the ninth 
psalm, on the other hand, does not deny that God exists. He 
does not think of God at all. 
Anselm's fool, the fool who dwells in Anselm, then, does 
not doubt, but willfully denies, that God exists. The end of 
the fourth chapter confirms this, where Anselm thanks God 
for an illumination in the light of which he could not fail 
to understand that God is even if he did not want to, or 
wished not to, believe it: 
I thank You, good Lord, I thank You, because what I 
previously believed because You granted [it], I now so 
understand because You shed light (on it] that (even] if 
I were unwilling to believe that You are, I would not be 
able not to understand [that You are.] 31 
Here it is clear not only that the fool's denial that God is 
reflects what the fool wants to think, and not what the fool 
in fact believes, but also that, when Anselm considers the 
31 Anselm, 104: "Gratias tibi, bone Domine, gratias tibi, 
quia quod prius credidi te donante, iam sic intelligo te 
illuminante, ut, si te esse nolim credere, non possim non 
intelligere." 
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possibility of a willful denial, he has himself in mind. 
This contradicts Flasch directly. He claims that 
Anselm's fool is an atheist indeed. His argument depends on 
his understanding of the position that Anselm intends to use 
his analysis to undermine. According to Flasch, Anselm would 
refute the "denial of the existence of a being beyond which 
a more perfect cannot be thought." 32 This is surely true in 
a sense, but the denial in question is an odd one: it is not 
that of someone who believes his own words. Anselm's fool 
wants to deny the existence of a God whom he himself, in 
some sense, sees. Anselm's reference, in Chapter 3, to God 
as creator only makes this fact clearer and more dramatic. 
Anselm does not just assume, as Flasch argues, a shared 
vision of the being who is something than which a greater 
cannot be thought, he assumes that the vision includes a 
belief that this being is the Creator. 
But Flasch has other evidence as well. He points espe-
cially to the character of Anselm's answer to Gaunilo's 
Reply on Behalf of the Fool. Gaunilo seems to take the first 
chapters of the Proslogion as an attempt to prove that God 
exists, and he argues that they fail. Flasch notices that 
Anselm responds to Gaunilo point by point, rather than by 
explaining that Gaunilo has mistaken his intent. But it is 
important to consider just how Anselm actually responds to 
32 Flasch, 7: "die Bestreitung der Existenz eines Wesens, 
iiber das hinaus Vollkommeneres nicht gedacht werden kann." The 
emphasis is Flasch's. 
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Gaunilo. In the beginning of his answer, he reminds Gaunilo 
first of all where their discussion must begin. Against 
Gaunilo's claim that "that than which ••• " is neither under-
stood nor thought, Anselm writes, "I use your faith and your 
conscience as my most solid argument. " 33 If Anselm' s book 
is in any sense an argument for God's existence, it is one 
that depends, at least in his own view, on the experience of 
faith. 
This response by Anselm is important in two ways. First, 
it confirms the claim that his argument begins with a belief 
in God. Second, it speaks to the important role that belief 
plays: it is the belief that guarantees that the words with 
which Anselm points to God--"that than which ••• "--are in 
fact understood. The proof, of course, depends on both 
sides' agreeing that such a being is, at least, in the 
understanding, and this agreement flows from a matter of 
faith. If my understanding of "understanding" is correct, 
then this is what understanding the words "something than 
which none greater can be thought" requires. 
Flasch knows perfectly well that this is Anselm's first 
answer to Gaunilo. He even points out that Anselm's purpose 
is merely to insist that Anselm and Gaunilo share the very 
33 Anselm, 130: "Si 'quo maius cogitari non potest' non 
intelligitur vel cogitatur nee est in intellectu vel 
cogitatione: profecto Deus aut non est quo maius cogitari non 
possit, aut non intelligitur vel cogitatur et in intellectu 
vel cogitatione. Quod falsum sit, fide et conscientia tua pro 
firmissimo utor argumento." 
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same understanding that Anselm shares with the fool: 
When Anselm inakes mention, in his. answer, of Ga uni lo' s 
Christian belief, then [he does so], strictly speaking, 
only in the context [of his claim] that the content of 
his formula exists in the understanding of a believer 
(like Gaunilo) at least just as much as in the under-
standing of an unbeliever who enters into Anselm's 
discussion--even if, as in the case of an atheist, [it 
exists] without any positing of [the being's] existence 
[in fact] • 34 
But if Anselm really thinks that the shared understanding in 
question could be independent of belief, then he would not 
need to appeal to Gaunilo's faith. He could merely remind 
Gaunilo that, when one hears the words "that than which a 
greater cannot be thought," one understands what one hears. 
Gaunilo's response to Anselm was, in part, to deny it to 
be certain that he has such a being in his understanding any 
differently than he has "any false things and things that 
exist in themselves in no way at all. " 35 And here is where 
Flasch's understanding of the debate seems most peculiar. He 
suggests that it is Anselm's intention to refute Gaunilo by 
pointing out that, because Gaunilo believes, God is in his 
understanding just as God is in the understanding of a 
34 Flasch, 18: "Wenn Anselm in seiner Antwort ( §1) an den 
christlichen Glauben Gaunilo's erinnert, dann strikt nur in 
dem Zusammenhang, dafi der Inhalt seiner Beweisformel im 
Verstand eines Glaubigen (wie Gaunilo) zumindest ebenso 
existiert wie im Verstand eines in Anselms Diskussion 
eintretenden Unglaubigen; eventuell noch, wie bei dem 
Atheisten, ohne Existenzbehauptung." 
35 Ga uni lo, Quid ad haec respondeat guidam pro insipiente, 
in Anselm, Opera Omnia, 125: "Nonne et quaecumque falsa ac 
nullo prorsus modo existentia in intellectu habere similiter 
dici possem, cum ea, dicente aliquo, quaecumque ille diceret, 
ego intelligerem?" 
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supposed atheist. But if this were so, the response would be 
no response at all. Anselm himself recognized, in his ac-
count of the fool's ability to think that there is no God, 
that the fool is able to think through words without any 
reference to the thing (res) the words refer to. Though his 
response to Gaunilo might work for one who has faith, it 
would not answer an atheist. Anselm's argument need not 
prevent someone who does not believe from denying that an 
understanding of God as that than which a greater cannot be 
thought is possible in just this way. The fool, if he is an 
atheist, can respond to Anselm that he can think through 
what Anselm says, but add that this does not mean that God 
is in his thought. 
On the other hand, the appeal to Gaunilo's faith shows 
clearly something about the fool that is less explicit in 
the Proslogion itself: that the fool is, as I have already 
argued for other reasons, one who believes in God. 36 It 
would, as such, be Anselm's attempt to let Gaunilo and his 
other readers know all the more clearly where the argument 
begins: namely, with the experience of God, present to the 
36 The first words of Anselm's response to Gaunilo only 
seem to deny this. He writes: 
Quoniam non me reprehendit in his dictis ille insipiens, 
contra quern sum locutus in meo opusculo, sed quidam non 
insipiens et catholicus pro insipiens: suf f icere mihi 
potest respondere catholico. (Anselm, 130) 
But he hardly could have insisted, in a polite exchange, that 
he was still arguing with a fool. Though he can speak about a 
part of himself as foolish, it would not do to say the same 
about Gaunilo. 
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understanding when those words that express what, as Anselm 
says, "we believe" about God are spoken. 
The end of the second chapter of the Proslogion confirms 
this claim. There, Anselm sums up the first argument con-
cerning God's being with a two-fold conclusion: "There 
exists, therefore, beyond doubt, something than which a 
greater cannot be thought both in the understanding and in 
fact. " 37 This conclusion, which is one of very few occur-
rences in the book of the verb "to exist" (existere), af-
firms that there is a connection between the claim that God 
exists in fact and the claim that God exists in the under-
standing, and this latter depends, as Anselm's use of the 
word "understanding" suggests, on an experience of God. 
Anselm's argument for the existence of God is, then, an 
argument from experience. He begins it from an understanding 
of the God that he strives to understand. But this claim is 
a strange one. It would appear that we have found an argu-
ment for the existence of God that depends on an experience 
of God as existent. If God is experienced as existing, why 
would one need to prove that God exists? This is the ques-
tion that will set the inquiry of the next chapter into 
motion. 
37 Ibid., 102: "Existit ergo procul dubio aliquid quo 
maius cogitari non valet, et in intellectu et in re." 
CHAPTER 4 
UNDERSTANDING WHAT WE BELIEVE 
We should now try to understand what sense it makes for 
Anselm to argue for something he already believes. One could 
claim, on one hand, that the proof is directed by one who 
has had and understood an experience of God's presence to 
those who doubt God's existence. But this is not the case: 
the proof cannot be conclusive without appealing to experi-
ence, and it is in fact directed at those who have experi-
enced the presence of God. The former conclusion emerged 
from the discussion of possibility, and the latter from the 
understanding of Anselm's fool. 
One could claim, on the other hand, that precisely those 
who have experienced God's presence might need the reassur-
ance that comes with proof. But here too there are difficul-
ties. In the first place, Anselm declares that he does not 
attempt to understand in order to believe. He is most ex-
plicit on this point: that he believes in order to under-
stand. The purpose of the proof is not, in other words, to 
confirm his faith. In the second place, Anselm does not 
infer that he is God's creature, but assumes it. He explains 
in the third chapter that it is impossible to think that God 
is not, and he does so by arguing that no mind could think 
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anything better than God because this would require that 
"the creature ascend above the creator." 1 Though Anselm 
goes on to argue that God is the being that all things need 
in order to be, this argument comes after he appeals to 
God's being the creator, a claim he takes as an evident 
fact. 
Several authors in this century have indeed claimed, as 
I do, that Anselm's analysis in the Proslogion depends on 
his faith. The most important of these accounts was offered 
by Karl Barth. We can begin anew by considering it. He looks 
at only the second and third chapters of Anselm's book--the 
analyses that concern God's being. Generally speaking, Barth 
takes these analyses to be arguments for the existence of 
God, but arguments of a strange sort: they are, he thinks, 
part of a theological algebra, one in which certain points 
of faith are assumed in order that others might be proven. 
Barth writes: 
This Existence of God which is accepted in faith is now 
to be recognized and proved on the presupposition of the 
Name of God likewise accepted in faith and is to be 
understood as necessary for thought. 
And Barth goes on to affirm that an algebra is quite liter-
ally what he means: 
Thus here the Name of God is the "!!" taken from the 
Credo by means of which the Existence of God now repre-
1 Anselm, 103: "Si enim aliqua mens posset cogitare 
aliquid melius te, ascenderet creatura super creatorem et 
judicaret de creatore; quad valde est absurdum." 
68 
sented as X is to be tra~sformed into a known quantity 
from one that is unknown (not disbelieved but as yet not 
realized) ••• 2 
According to Barth, Anselm begins his argument by assum-
ing one of two "known quantities" as given in order to 
establish the logical connection between the two. What sense 
does Barth make of such a logic? His account depends on his 
understanding of Anselm's use of "understanding" and of 
Anselm's view of the relationship between understanding and 
faith. 
Barth explains Anselm's understanding of understanding 
by considering the etymology of the word, "intellectus," 
that Anselm uses. To understand is to reckon or to gather 
inwardly: 
In explaining Anselm's use of "intelligere" it is vital-
ly important. to remember the literal meaning of the 
word: intus legere. After all that has been said, there 
can be no question but that the fundamental meaning of 
intelligere is legere: to reflect upon what has already 
been said in the Credo. 3 
Why does faith seek this reflection? Barth does point 
out that understanding brings with it both proof and rejoic-
ing, but it is important to see that, for Barth, this ques-
tion is not well posed. Faith does not seek understanding as 
though this were a task over and above its primary task, 
which is to believe? Seeking to understand a Credo is part 
2 Karl Barth, Fides Quaerens Intellectum, trans. Ian W. 
Robertson, (London: SCM Press, 1960; reprint, Mars , PA: 
Pickwick Publications, Pittsburg Reprint Series, 1985), 78 
(page references are to reprint edition). 
3 Ibid., 40. 
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of what faith is. Barth argues that the understanding that 
concerns Anselm is one "desired by faith," and explains: 
What we are speaking of is a spontaneous desire of 
faith. Fundamentally, the quaerere intellectum is really 
immanent in fides. Therefore it is not a question of 
faith "requiring" the "proof" or the "joy." There is 
absolutely no question at all of a requirement of faith. 
Anselm wants "proof" and "joy" because he wants 
intelligere and he wants intelligere because he be-
lieves. 4 
In Barth's view, then, faith seeks understanding because 
it is faith. The understanding it seeks is a reflection on, 
or a gathering together of, articles of faith. It proceeds 
by the assumption of one article in order to explore the 
rational character of its relation to others. Barth argues 
that Anselm reflects upon the existence of God in the first 
few chapters of the Proslogion, and that, in the rest of the 
Proslogion, Anselm reflects upon the nature of God. In each 
case, Anselm sets what he would like to reflect upon as an 
unknown, to be explored by the assumption of something else. 
This something else is Anselm's phrase "that than which a 
greater cannot be thought," and Barth calls the phase a 
"Name" of God. Anselm, he says, assumes this "Name," and, on 
the basis of its assumption, proves what he believes--nei-
ther as a means of affirming, or strengthening, his belief, 
nor of converting others to his belief, but as a means of 
reflecting upon, or understanding, that belief. 
The first thing to notice about Barth's account is the 
4 Ibid. I 16-7. 
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sense in which it agrees with those previously considered. 
Barth, no less than the analytic writers, views the analyses 
of the second and third chapters as attempts to prove that 
God exists. He differs only in his account of what we might 
call the intent of that proof: rather than viewing it as a 
polemical attempt to affirm something on rational grounds 
alone, he views it as an attempt to reflect upon faith. Even 
for him, though,·what is at issue is the existence of God. 
Let me say here, by way of anticipation, that there is 
reason to question even this--that is, whether the analyses 
of the two chapters concern the existence of God. 
The second thing to notice is that, according to Barth, 
Anselm's analyses proceed from no more than the assumption 
of the "Name" of God. I have argued, however, that, if they 
are construed as polemical arguments, they depend on much 
more. Insofar as Anselm would prove that God exists, he must 
assume more than merely the "Name" of God. Not only must the 
statement, "God is something than which none greater can be 
conceived," be an unproven premise to the argument, but the 
possibility of such a being must also be granted from the 
start. Anselm can take God's possibility for granted because 
he starts from an experience that affirms that God exists. 
In other words, if Anselm were to "bracket" the existence of 
God, or treat it as an unknown X, his argument would be 
circular. His proof of God's existence would assume the 
existence of God. 
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There is yet a third matter to note about Barth's posi-
tion, specifically about his understanding of Anselm's 
understanding. Barth defines it, by appeal to etymology, as 
an inward, or inner, reckoning (intus legere). "Legere" 
means, first of all, "to bring together, gather, collect." 
It can also mean "to read." 5 Barth's claim, then, is that, 
for Anselm, to understand is to collect discrete elements 
inwardly. This jibes well with Barth's claim that Anselm 
sets out to prove God's existence in order to see its con-
nection to other elements of what he believes. But in ex-
plaining "understanding" in this way, Barth cites no passag-
es from the Proslogion or from Anselm's other works. He pays 
almost no attention to Anselm's use of "thinking" 
(cogitare), and he ignores the textual evidence that can be 
brought to bear on the attempt to see through Anselm's use 
of "understanding." 
I have already considered this evidence. I argued that 
understanding is, for Anselm, less a gathering-within than 
it is a vision. Such a vision may of course depend on a 
gathering-within that precedes it. One might have to collect 
disparate elements, gather them into a whole, in order to 
have some one thing for the understanding to see. But this 
only points back to the fact that Barth does not discuss 
Anselm's understanding of thought. Anselm describes thought, 
5 C. T. Lewis, Intermediate Latin Dictionary, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1993), s.v. "lego." 
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as we have seen, by an appeal to a metaphor: thinking is 
saying in the heart. Such inward speech is what Barth means 
by understanding. A faithful account of the Proslogion must 
distinguish faith, thinking, and understanding, and show the 
connections among them. Barth uses the third of these in 
place of the second, and cannot reserve for the understand-
ing its proper place. 
It is, then, necessary to look more deeply if one is to 
understand the goal of Anselm's analysis. I will bring a 
range of considerations to bear. Taken together, these 
considerations will suggest that what have been taken so far 
as proofs, of whatever sort, of the existence of God make 
more sense as parts of an exploration of what, as Anselm 
says, "we" believe God to be. On such an understanding, the 
analysis appears to concern less the question of God's 
existence than the manner of God's being. 
We can look for the purpose of the analysis by consider-
ing more exactly what Anselm claims he will prove. Anselm 
uses the same phrase in the various places where he appears 
to claim that he will show that God exists. For example, the 
second chapter of the Proslogion claims to show that "God 
truly is." 6 I have thus far assumed that "God truly is" is 
simply a synonym for "God exists." It is partly on this 
6 Anselm, 101. The title of the chapter is: "Quod vere 
sit deus." See also the preface, where Anselm says that he 
seeks an argument to show, among other things, that God "truly 
is" (Deus vere est). 
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basis that I began by assuming that Anselm sets out to prove 
God's existence. The two standard translations of the 
Proslogion into English confirm this reading. M.J. 
Charlesworth renders Anselm's "Deus vere est," as "God truly 
exists." 7 S.N. Deane offers, "Truly there is a God." 8 Each 
treats the word "truly" (vere) as though they think it 
merely intensifies a claim that God exists, without bearing 
on the claim's meaning essentially. 
A German theologian, Anselm Stolz, however, argues for 
another understanding of "vere est." He claims that the 
phrase is a technical term taken from Augustine. The dis-
tinction the phrase points to is not between existence and 
non-existence. It is, instead, between a certain form of 
being, true being, and any other form of being. Stolz writes 
that when Anselm attributes "vere esse" to God, he means 
that God possesses a wholly unique type of being. He ex-
plains that God is not subject to alteration like earthly 
things and that God did not pass from non-being to being. 
Stolz concludes that to say that God "truly is" means that 
"his being is not touched in any way by non-being, that the 
concept of being applies, in its ultimate and true sense, to 
St. Anselm's Proslogion, trans. and intro. M. J. 
Charlesworth, (Notre Dame: Univ. of Notre Dame Press, 1979), 
117. 
8 St. Anselm: Basic Writings, intro. Charles Hartshorne 
and trans. S. N. Deane, (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1962), 7. 
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him alone. " 9 
The account of Stolz runs directly contrary to Barth's 
account of the same expression. Like the analytic writers, 
Barth takes Anselm's analysis to be an argument for the 
existence of God. He argues that the conclusion of Chapter 2 
explains its chapter heading. The heading reads, "that truly 
God is," and the· chapter concludes, "there exists, there-
fore, beyond doubt something than which a greater cannot be 
thought, both in the understanding and in fact. " 10 Barth 
takes this to imply that to say that "God truly is" means 
that God exists, and exists not just in the understanding 
but in fact as well. 11 
There are, however, two indications that the aim of 
9 Anselm Stolz, Anselm von Canterbury, (Mlinchen: Verlag 
K6sel-Pustet, 1937), 17: "Gegen die erste laflt sich geltend 
machen, daB der Ausdruck 'vere esse' als Fachausdruck dem hl. 
Augustinus gelauf ig war. Er bedeutet bei ihm aber nicht 
'wirklich dasein' im Gegensatz zu 'nicht-sein', der Ton liegt 
vielmehr auf dem vere, und wenn Gott das 'vere esse' 
zugeschrieben wird, ist damit gesagt, daB Gott eine ganz 
besondere Art von sein besitzt, d. h. er ist nicht wandelbar 
wie die irdische Dinge, er ist nicht aus dem Nichtsein zum 
Sein libergegangen, er ist nicht heute so und morgen anders, 
sondern er bleibt sich irnrner gleich und verwirklicht in sich 
absolute Seinsflille. Er 'ist wirklich' (vere est), d. h. sein 
Sein ist in keiner Weise vom Nichtsein berilhrt, ihm allein 
komrnt der Begrif f des Seins im eigentlichen und wahren Sinn 
ZUo II 
10 Anselm, 102: "Existit ergo procul dubio aliquid quo 
maius cogitari non valet, et intellectu et in re." 
11 It is worth noting that Barth's account does not aim 
at excluding the point Stolz makes--that "true" being means 
the being unique to God--but to insist that, even if that 
point is granted, esse still means existere. See: Barth, 100. 
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Anselm's discussion of God's being is rather, just as Stolz 
says, to attribute to God a very special manner of being. 
One is the attention Anselm pays to just the qualities that 
Stolz identifies as belonging to "true being": both the 
latter part of the first half of the work (Chapter 13) and 
the middle part of the second half (Chapter 18-21) deal with 
the distinctions between how God and how created beings are 
with respect to time and space. 
But perhaps the strongest indication that the discussion 
of God's being is an effort to attribute to God a particular 
manner of being is in the third chapter. Anselm sets out to 
show, in the second, that God truly is. And he turns in the 
third to argue that God is "so truly that He cannot even be 
thought not to be. " 12 Analytical writers like Malcolm and 
others take this chapter as a distinct argument for the very 
same claim that they take Anselm to make in Chapter 2, and 
they do so even if they add that, as Malcolm puts it, "there 
are two different pieces of reasoning which (Anselm] did not 
distinguish from one another. " 13 But Anselm does distinguish 
the two analyses by distinguishing the conclusions that they 
aim at. Each is, it is true, an argument that God "truly 
is." But while the one affirms that God indeed truly is; the 
other adds that God is so truly that "he cannot even be 
12 Ibid., 102: "Quod utique sic vere est, ut nee cogitari 
poossit non esse." 
13 The Ontological Argument, 136. 
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thought not to be." This latter claim could, of course, 
refer only to the manner of God's being. After all, whether 
or not a thing can be thought as not being does not neces-
sarily bear on whether that thing exists. In addition, 
Anselm's formulation requires that a thing could be more or 
less truly. It hardly makes sense to talk of the degree to 
which God is if all that is at stake is whether God is--that 
is, if what is at stake is God's existence considered only 
as a bare fact. 
Anselm's argument in Chapter 3 argues directly against 
Barth's position that esse means existere, even if it is 
also central to Anselm's position to show that God's being--
or, as Barth would say, existence--is unique. It makes sense 
to see Anselm's claim, that God is so truly, as an emphatic 
affirmation of what Stolz understands him to say--that God's 
being is untouched by non-being and this so much that God 
cannot even be thought not to be--that God cannot even be 
touched by non-being in our thought. But it makes no sense 
to understand the point of Chapter 3 to be to show that God 
exists, which was purportedly shown already in Chapter 2, 
and even more so. 
Barth himself recognizes this problem. He begins his 
account of Chapter 3 by claiming that it concerns a differ-
ent sense of "true being" than Chapter 2. He affirms that, 
in the second chapter, "true being" means, as he has already 
claimed, "being in the understanding and in thought." But he 
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concedes that it means, as the third chapter concludes, that 
God is such as cannot be thought not to be. 14 
Anselm, however, makes no such distinction. He presents 
the two chapters as though they were two analyses pointing 
to claims that differ in degree but not in kind--namely, 
that God truly is and that God is so truly that God cannot 
be thought not to be. In the first case, Anselm shows that 
God's being is such that God's being both in the understand-
ing and in fact follows from our understanding of what we 
believe God to be: Anselm cannot understand what he believes 
with6ut understanding that God is. In the second case, 
Anselm shows that God's being is such that God cannot even 
be thought not to be. If Barth were right, it would have 
made sense for Anselm to have distinguished the two senses 
of "being" by using two different words. And it cannot be 
argued that Anselm had no such words, for Barth himself 
points out that Anselm uses "existere" at the end of Chapter 
2. 
Both indications suggest that when Anselm writes of 
God's being, what he is interested in is not to show that 
God is, but to understand in what manner--that is, how very 
truly--God is. Anselm argues that God, and God alone, truly 
is. Gregory Schufreider's recent book confirms this claim. 
This may not appear to be so right away, because Schufreider 
generally speaks of God's existence rather than of God's 
14 See Barth, 132. 
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being. He nonetheless insists that it is not the fact that 
God exists but the unique manner in which God exists that is 
at issue for Anselm, and does so by showing how the question 
is rooted in arguments Anselm makes in the Monologion. 15 
It is important to keep in mind, however, that this does 
not say much about what it means to say that God truly is. 
All that is certain at this point is that it means that 
there is no sense in which God is not. The non-being of God 
has no place in the understanding, no place in fact, and no 
place in thought. All I have claimed thus far is that 
Anselm's two analyses are not so much proofs that God ex-
ists--polemical or otherwise--but rather explorations of the 
character of God's being. 
In order now to see more of what it means to say that 
God truly is we need to ask why Anselm argues that God truly 
is. It is necessary to ask what role such an argument could 
have in the Proslogion. We can begin by focussing on two 
aspects of Anselm's work: on the fact that the analyses 
concerning God's being are just two of several analyses that 
Anselm undertakes and on Anselm's use of the verb "to under-
stand". I will argue that the analyses begin to make sense 
when seen in the context of a larger effort to see all of 
his beliefs concerning what he calls "divine substance" 
(divina substantia) and to see them as a whole. 
That the whole range of analyses in the Proslogion 
15 Schufreider, 113-177. 
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concerns more that just the existence of God can not be 
denied--even by those who take the two first analyses as 
arguments for the existence of God, and even if they under-
stand each of the others as aimed at proving some other 
particular claim. No matter how fiercely anyone insists that 
the first two chapters aim only to show that God exists, he 
or she must still admit that the Proslogion includes, in 
addition to these, other analyses directed at rather differ-
ent claims. Through the first half of the book, Anselm sets 
out a series of analyses that address various beliefs that 
he holds. After the chapters concerning God's being, he 
turns to other aspects of what he believes. He argues that 
God is "whatever it is better to be than not to be," that 
God is the creator who, as the only one of all things that 
exists "through itself" (existens per seipsum), made all 
other things from nothing. And he goes on to treat of God's 
sensitivity, incorporeality, omnipotence, mercy, impassive-
ness, justice, and of God's relationship to all these quali-
ties. It is important to consider how these various analyses 
work together. Their breadth reflects Anselm's most general 
statement of what the Proslogion is about. In the first 
paragraph of the preface, he writes: 
I began to seek with myself, whether perhaps one argu-
ment could be found that would need none other than 
itself alone to test itself and alone would suffice to 
affirm that God truly is and is the highest good, need-
ing none other, which all things·require in order to be 
and to be well and whatever we believe concerning divine 
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substance. 16 
Anselm thus sets himself one task: to affirm 
(astruendum) a series of beliefs about God, only one of 
which is that God truly is. It is not clear, however, what 
he means by "to affirm." This word is a key to understanding 
what Anselm hopes his argument will enable him to do. I have 
already pointed out reasons for thinking that the word could 
not, in the context in which Anselm uses it, mean "to 
prove." But to say what the word does not mean is not to 
explain what it does mean. It is not to look at the word 
directly at all. 
It is important to determine first whether the word even 
admits of any other interpretation. The standard transla-
tions suggest that it does not. Deane has "to demonstrate" 17 
and Charlesworth has "to prove. " 18 Even Schufreider uses "to 
demonstrate. " 19 I will consider the word at some length be-
cause it is at the core of the lines I have just cited, 
which are the only explanation Anselm gives in the 
Proslogion of the analyses the book includes. To figure out 
16 Anselm, 93: " ••• coepi mecum quaerere, si forte posset 
inveniri unum argumentum, quod nullo alio ad se probandum quam 
se solo indigeret, et solum ad astruendum quia Deus vere est, 
et quia est summum bonum nullo alio indigens, et quo omnia 
indigent ut sint et ut bene sint, et quaecumque de divina 
credimus substantia, sufficeret." 
17 Deane, 1. 
18 Charlesworth, 103. 
19 Schufreider, 313. 
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what the word means, I will look first at the word in gener-
al and then at Anselm's use of it. 
"Astruendum" is the gerund of "astruere." Anselm uses 
forms of the verb rarely, only five times in all his 
works. 20 The word is built by adding the preposition "ad-" 
to the verb, "struo," whose primary meaning is "to set," "to 
arrange," or "to construct." This word survives in our word 
"structure." In classical Latin, "astruo" meant "to build," 
"to heap or pile on," "to add," or "to provide." The Oxford 
Latin Dictionary mentions no uses that could be described as 
cognitive. 21 In classical Latin, "astruo" did not mean 
anything like "to demonstrate" or "to prove." 
That dictionary's immediate predecessor, the one by 
Lewis and Short, confirms this conclusion. At the same time, 
it recognizes that cognitive uses of the verb exist nonethe-
less. At the end of the entry for the word, the compilers 
note that the "signification affirmare ••• is found in no 
Latin author. " 22 They add that what appears to be an in-
stance of that usage in Pliny is probably a bad reading. The 
even older dictionary by Forcellini also refers specifically 
to the questionable passage in Pliny. Forcellini too points 
20 A Concordance of the Works of St. Anselm, ed. G.R. 
Evans, (Millwood, NY: Kraus International Publications, 1984), 
s.v. "astru-." 
21 Oxford Latin Dictionary, 1st comb. ed. (1982), s.v. 
"astruo." 
22 Charlton T. Lewis and Charles Short, A Latin Dictio-
nary, (1975) s.v. "astruo." 
82 
out that others read the passage differently. 23 
But whether or not the classical word was given a cogni-
tive sense accidentally, through a bad reading of Pliny, or 
by deliberate use of a metaphor, medieval authors did use it 
that way. By referring to the misreading of Pliny, the clas-
sical dictionaries suggest that the word came to be a syn-
onym for "affirmare," which means "to support," "to con-
firm," or "to assert." One sense of the word that a French 
dictionary of the Latin used by Christian authors lists is 
"to prove," and it refers specifically to the construction 
of an argument. At the same time, it also suggests "to 
guarantee" and "to affirm. " 24 My task is to try to determine 
just what Anselm means. 
Augustine uses the word in an interesting passage in his 
Confessions. In Book 4, Chapter 15, he writes, "and I de-
fined and distinguished as fair, what is so, absolutely of 
itself; and fit, which becomes graceful when applied to some 
other thing: and confirmed (astruebam) my argument by corpo-
real examples. " 25 Here, just as Watts suggests with his 
translation, Augustine does not seem to mean that he demon-
23 Egidio Forcellini, Totius Latinitatis Lexicon, 1st 
German ed. (1833), s.v. "astruo." 
24 Dictionnaire Latin-Frangais des auteurs chretiens, 
(1954), s.v. "adstruere." 
25 Augustine, Confessions, ed. W. H. D. Rouse and trans. 
William Watts, (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1977), 190-1: 
"et pulchrum, quod per se ipsum, aptum autem, quod ad aliquid 
adcommodatum deceret, definiebam et distinguebam et exemplis 
corporeis adstruebam." 
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strates or proves his definitions with examples. "Ad-
struebam" means "I added on to" or, perhaps better, "I 
supported." Augustine has definitions. He builds them up, or 
adds to them, by adding examples that confirm them. Augus-
tine is very far from using the word the way that we use "to 
prove." He does not refer to any argument. 
But let me turn to Anselm. A survey of the four instanc-
es other than the one in the Proslogion in which Anselm uses 
the word suggests that he himself means something like "to 
add together," "to build up," or "to affirm." Though the 
word could mean "to prove," that is not necessarily what it 
means. The word occurs, in various forms, twice in de 
Grammatico and twice in Cur Deus Homo. 
De Grammatico is a dialogue between a teacher and a 
student. In it, the word occurs close to the beginning and 
very near the end. In the first instance, the teacher is 
explaining an argument that he makes by process of elimina-
tion. There are two alternatives, and one of them must be 
true. He says: "whatever is able to build up (ad astruendam) 
one part, destroys the other, and whatever weakens one, 
strengthens the other. " 26 Here, Anselm shows that he thinks 
of "astruere" as a synonym for "roborare," which means "to 
strengthen" or "make strong." This makes perfect sense if 
the word means "to prove," but also if it means "to build 
26 Anselm, 146: "quidquid valet ad astruendam unam partem, 
destruit alteram, et quidquid unam debilitat, alteram 
roborat." 
84 
up" or "affirm." 
Towards the end of the book, the teacher warns the 
student against stubborn adherence to the conclusions that 
they have come to together, "I do not want you so to cling 
to these things that we have said that you hold on to them 
stubbornly although someone be able to destroy them with 
stronger arguments and build up (astruere) different 
things." 27 Here too, Anselm uses the word to express the 
possibility that someone might come along and, having used 
arguments to destroy what he himself and his student hold, 
goes on to build up, or construct, by whatever means, an 
account different from the one he has developed with his 
student. The construction of such an account might include 
proof, but it might not. 
Cur Deus Homo is also a dialogue. At one point, Anselm 
asks his young friend Boso, "How should he be answered who 
asserts (astruit) that what is necessary is impossible be-
cause he does not know how it could be?" 28 At another point, 
later in the book, Anselm is discussing the necessity ac-
cording to which.one can say that "the heavens revolve by 
necessity because they revolve." He explains that this is 
27 Ibid., 168: "nolo te sic iis quae diximus inhaerere, 
ut ea pertinaciter teneas, si quis valioribus argumentis haec 
destruere et diversa astruere." 
28 Ibid., v.II, 95: "Quid respondendum est illi qui 
idcirco astruit esse impossibile quod necesse est esse, quia 
noscit quomodo sit?" 
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the necessity that "seems to destroy any alternative and to 
affirm ( astruere) that all things are by necessity. " 29 
In the latter of these two cases, "astruere" seems to 
mean something like "affirm" or "confirm," and if arguments 
can carry the force of necessity, then this instance may 
bear on what it means for an argument to be sought that will 
"affirm" what we believe. But in the former case, the word 
is used somewhat differently. The word could mean "to af-
firm" or "strengthen," but only in the sense that one could 
be strengthened in a belief by one's own failure to imagine 
any alternative to it. Here, the word. seems to mean more 
nearly "to assert." 
In general, then, "astruere" may have the sense of 
building up claims, of affirmation, or of assertion. This 
can involve an appeal to an argument, as the second example 
from de Grammatico suggests, but this example does not 
explain the relationship between the argument, on the one 
hand, and the claim the argument concerns, on the other. And 
just this question is crucial. The other example from that 
book and the second example from Cur Deus Homo are even more 
ambiguous; in neither case is it clear whether arguments or 
proof have a role in affirming or showing at all. Finally, 
the first example from Cur Deus Homo seems quite different. 
There, the affirmation that the word points to is that of 
29 Ibid., 125: "videtur utrumlibet destruere et omnia esse 
ex necessitate astruere." 
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someone who lacks an argument, someone who asserts because 
he or she cannot conceive of an alternative. Even in the one 
instance, then, that seems most clearly to involve an argu-
ment, the second example from de Grammatica, the only role 
that is certainly given to argument is the one opposed to 
affirmation. Anselm speaks of the possibility that someone 
could come along and destroy the things that he and his 
student have said with stronger arguments than those they 
have used. He or she would then be able to build up a dif-
ferent account. But it is not certain whether Anselm means 
that this person would build with arguments, or use argu-
ments only to destroy positions that prevent the affirmation 
of whatever he or she wants to affirm. 
These four occurrences of the word thus suggest that 
though the word might mean "to prove," it is not certain 
that it does. The instance in which Anselm most explicitly 
connects affirmation to argument, however, is the one in the 
Proslogion. Thus the only way to determine just in what 
sense his "single argument" is supposed to build up what 
Anselm intends it to build is to observe the role of the 
argument within the work. 
Let me briefly review where my interpretation now 
stands. I began with Anselm's own description of the role of 
his argument. I did this by considering one crucial word of 
that description, the verb "astruere." I showed that the 
word can mean "to prove," but, also by looking at Anselm's 
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various uses of the word that this is not certainly how he 
understands it. Anselm's use covers a range of meanings: "to 
affirm," "to build up," and "to assert." To consider such 
evidence, however, does no more than open the way to the 
central question: namely, what does the word mean when 
Anselm uses it in the Proslogion? 
Nothing less than a reading of the work as a whole can 
tell, and it is worth noting that at least three standard 
translations are quite different from the English ones we 
already saw. Schmitt writes that Anselm sought an argument 
"that would alone suffice to support that God exists in 
truth. " 30 According to Stolz, Anselm sought to find an 
argument sufficient "in order to show that God in truth has 
being. " 31 Stolz' s word, "dartun," is ambiguous. It can mean 
"demonstrate," but it can also mean merely "show" or "pres-
ent." According to Alexandre Koyre, Anselm writes that he 
sought an argument that would suffice "pour demontrer. " 32 
The French word, like Stolz's German word, is ambiguous. It 
could mean "to prove," but it could also mean "to point 
out." 
30 Anselm, Pros logion, 2d ed. , text and trans. Franciscus 
Schmitt, (Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, 1984) , 69: " ••• das 
allein hinreichte, um zu stlitzen, dafi Gott in Wahrheit 
existiert ••• " 
31 Stolz, 4 7: "um darzutun, dafi Gott im Wahrheit Sein 
hat ••• " 
32 Sainte Anselm, Sur L'Existence de Dieu, ed. and trans. 
Alexandre Koyre, (Paris: Librarie Philosophique J. Vrin, 
1992)' 3. 
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We can begin to consider the word as it occurs in the 
Proslogion by noticing that it has not one, but rather a 
series of direct objects. Anselm seeks one argument suffi-
cient to show, "that God truly is and _is the highest good, 
needing none other, which all things require in order to be 
and to be well and whatever we believe concerning divine 
substance." 33 The verb thus has three objects: the first, 
that God truly is; the second, that God is the highest good, 
needing none other, which all things need both to be and to 
be well; and the third, whatever we believe concerning 
divine substance. This third, however, does not so much 
point to any belief in particular, as it indicates that 
there is more at stake than two claims about divine sub-
stance: it makes it clear that Anselm hopes that his one 
argument will address all that he believes concerning divine 
substance, that it will address what he believes as a whole. 
For now, let us consider just the first two objects. One 
way to see what Anselm means here is to ask why he seeks one 
argument to show, to affirm, or to build up these beliefs. 
Anselm himself invites special attention to this question by 
reporting that it was the fact that the Monologion was 
"woven together by the interconnection of many arguments" 34 
that moved him to write the Proslogion in the first place. 
33 see note 8, p.52. 
34 Ibid., 93: " ••• multorum concatenatione contextum 
argumentorum ••• " 
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Why, then, does he seek one argument? 
A return to Anselm's description of the persona in which 
the book is written suggests a possible answer. Anselm says 
that he writes: 
in the person of one trying to lift up his mind to the 
contemplation of God and seeking to understand what he 
believes. 35 
It is the second aspect of the task he describes that is 
interesting here: Anselm writes as one seeking to understand 
what he believes. To do so he must learn to see all that he 
believes and see it all as one. This is because his beliefs 
are many--that God truly is, that God is the highest good, 
etc.--and because, for Anselm, "to understand" is to see a 
whole at once. He confesses in Chapter 18 that the qualities 
that God is "are many," and he adds, "My narrow understand-
ing cannot see so many with one simultaneous insight, in 
order that it might simultaneously be delighted by all. " 36 
Perhaps, then, Anselm seeks to affirm all his beliefs about 
God with one argument because he seeks to understand whatev-
er he believes about God and because to do so is to see 
those beliefs as a single whole. 
The question is, then, how each of the arguments he 
makes--or, more precisely, each of the analyses of his one 
35 Ibid., 93-4: "sub persona conantis erigere mentem suam 
ad contemplandum Deum et quaerentis intelligere quod credit." 
36 Ibid., 114: "Multa sunt haec, non potest angustus 
intelectus meus tot uno simul intuitu videre, ut omnibus simul 
delectetur." 
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argument--contributes to an effort to understand, or see, 
God as a whole. I have already argued that the main force of 
the arguments concerning the being of God is to set God 
apart, to show that God's being is unique. I will now argue 
that the next arguments in the book fit the same pattern. 
For though they concern a wide range of divine qualities, 
they all aim to identify God as "the highest good, needing 
none other, that all things need both to be and to be well." 
After Anselm has affirmed that God truly is, he seems to 
turn rather to the third thing he proposes to affirm rather 
than directly to the second. The chapters that follow the 
discussion of God's being deal with a range of beliefs that 
Anselm holds about God, and his most emphatic identification 
of God as the highest good will wait until the second half 
of the Proslogion. It appears that Anselm turns first to 
affirming "whatever we believe about divine substance." But 
this appearance deceives. The various analyses in Chapters 6 
through 11 only aim to explain how God can be whatever it is 
better to be than not to be, and Chapters 12 and 13 link 
this with the claim that God is the source of all good. 
These analyses, then, indeed affirm that God is "the highest 
good, needing none other, which all things need in order to 
be and be well.". 
Let us go through these chapters in some detail. The 
discussion of attributes begins in Chapter 5. There Anselm 
makes two arguments: that God is the creator and that God is 
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whatever it is better to be than not to be. The first 
serves, as the arguments concerning God's being do, to 
distinguish God from all else that is. The second opens the 
fuller analysis of divine attributes that follows. 
Chapter 4 had been a slight departure from the progress 
of the argument. After having argued, in Chapter 3, that God 
cannot even be thought not to be, Anselm explains in the 
fourth chapter the one sense in which one could think, or 
say in one's heart, that God is not. He explains that, in 
one sense, "to think" means to think the word (vox) that 
signifies a thing. Here, "to think" means nothing more than 
to pronounce to oneself. In this limited sense of the word, 
anything can be thought to be or not to be: one need only 
say the words. Anselm points out that to think, in this 
sense, that God is not requires only that one say the words, 
"either without any (meaning] or with some foreign mean-
ing. ,,37 
Anselm then starts Chapter 5 with a question: "What, 
then, are You, Lord God, than whom nothing greater can be 
thought?" 38 He answers first with an argument. He argues for 
a precise version of a claim that he has already made: that 
God is the creator. Earlier, he had appealed to what must 
have been for him a fact--that God is the creator--in the 
37 Ibid., 104: " ••• aut sine ulla aut cum aliqua extranea 
significatione ••• " 
38 Ibid., 104: "Quid igitur es, Domine Deus, quo nil maius 
valet cogitari?" 
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course of his identification of God as the being that caBnot 
be thought not to be. That was in Chapter 3, where he point-
ed out that if God were not the being that is so truly that 
it cannot be thought not to be, then "the creature would 
ascend above the creator." 39 Here, he deduces that God is 
the creator with· the same argument he used in order to show 
that God truly is. 40 He writes: 
But what are You unless [You are] that which is the 
highest of all things, which alone [of all things] 
exists through itself, and made all others from nothing? 
For whatever is not this is less than could be thought. 
But this cannot be thought concerning You. 41 
Anselm emphasizes God's unique character in two ways: by 
saying that God is the only thing that exists through itself 
and by saying that God made all other things from nothing. 
Anything less would be less than can be thought. 
But Anselm goes on: if God is the highest of all, which 
created all, then God must be whatever it is better to be 
than not to be. For with respect to any given good, Anselm 
can ask whether it could be absent from God. He can conclude 
that it could not by appealing to the same argument that he 
has just used: that God would then be less than can be 
39 See note 63. 
40 The fact that he appeals to the purported fact before 
he makes the argument only underscores that there can be no 
question of Anselm's wanting to prove, in a polemical sense, 
that God is the creator. 
41 Ibid., 104: "Sed quid es, nisi id quad summum omnium 
solum existens per seipsum, omnia alia fecit de nihilo? 
Quidquid enim hoc non est, minus est quam cogitari possit. Sed 
hoc de te cogitari non potest." 
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thought. In fact, he asks, "What good is then absent from 
the highest good, through which every good is?" 42 He answers 
with a list of the goods that God is, a list that introduces 
the analyses of particular goods that will follow, and he 
completes the list by concluding that God is "whatever it is 
better to be than not to be • " 4 3 
This is the second indication that the series of analy-
ses that flow out of Anselm's one argument are parts of 
Anselm's effort to see all that he believes about divine 
substance and see it all in one gaze. The first was that 
Anselm aims at a whole: the third object of astruendum is 
"whatever we believe." The second is that Anselm summarizes 
his list of divine attributes by saying that God is "whatev-
er it is better to be than not to be." But it is worth also 
looking more closely at the arguments that Anselm makes 
about particular attributes in order to see whether these 
arguments also point towards a whole. 
The analysis of particular goods takes the form of a 
series of reflections on pairs of qualities that seem mutu-
ally exclusive, or contradictory. Anselm asks how God could 
be sensitive though not a body (Chapter 6), omnipotent 
though unable to do many things (Chapter 7), and merciful 
though impassive (Chapter 8). It will be necessary to return 
42 Ibid., 104: "Quod ergo bonum deest summo bono, per quod 
est omne bonum." 
43 Ibid., 104: "quidquid melius est esse quam non esse." 
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to the third of these later, but for now I will only point 
out that in each case Anselm resolves the difficulty by 
explaining that it depends on human misunderstanding. God 
can be said to be sensible, but only in the sense that God 
knows, in a divine way, what a creature that sees or hears 
knows by hearing or sight. Though omnipotent, God can be 
said to be unable to do many things, because sometimes we 
says "unable" when we should, more properly, say "able": God 
is, for example, unable to do evil, but this "inability" is 
really a power--a power to avoid doing evil. God can be said 
to be merciful, even though impassive, because God's pres-
ence is a consolation to one in pain, even if God does not 
feel pain. In each case, qualities like sensible, incapable, 
and merciful have special meanings when they refer to God. 
Ans.elm then spends three chapters reflecting upon appar-
ent contradictions between God's justice and God's mercy, or 
goodness. The problem for Anselm is to understand how it is 
fitting for God both to punish those who are evil and to 
forgive them. Generally speaking, he finds each alternative 
easy enough to explain by itself by pointing to the appro-
priate sense of justice: 
How, then, is it just that You punish those who are evil 
and just that You pardon those who are evil? Do You 
justly, in one sense, punish those who are evil and 
justly, in another sense, pardon them? For when You 
punish those who are evil, it is just because it agrees 
with their merits; when, however, You pardon them, it is 
just not because it befits their merits, but because it 
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befits Your goodness. 44 
From all this he concludes that justice simply means 
what God wishes:· "For that alone which You wish is just, and 
what You do not wish is not just." But he cannot explain why 
any particular case should have one result rather than 
another. He continues: 
Thus Your mercy is born of Your justice, because it is 
just that You be so good that You are good in pardoning. 
And this is perhaps why the highest justice can wish 
good things for those who are evil. But if it is somehow 
possible to grasp why You can wish to save those who are 
evil, surely no reason can comprehend why, of similar 
evil [people], You save some rather than others through 
highest goodness and condemn some rather than others 
through highest justice. 45 
The result of this analysis, then, is Anselm's admission 
that he cannot understand the individual instances of God's 
justice. Even if he can explain how any given instance of 
God's judgment exemplifies justice, he cannot explain why it 
should exemplify justice in one way rather than in another. 
At the end he returns to the claim that the four analy-
44 Ibid., 108-9: "Quomodo ergo et iustum est ut malos 
punias, et iustum ut malis parcas? 
"An alio modo iuste punis malos, et alio modo iuste parcis 
malis? Cum enim punis malos, iustum est, quia illorum meritis 
convenit; cum vero parcis malis, iustum est, non quia illorum 
meritis, sed quia bonitati tuae condecens est." 
45 Ibid., 109: "Nam id solum iustum est quod vis, et non 
iustum quod non vis. 
"Sic ergo nascitur iustitia tua misericordia tua, quia 
iustum est te sic esse bonum, ut et parcendo sis bonus. Et hoc 
est forsitan, cur summe iustus potest velle bona malis. Sed si 
utcumque capi po.test, cur malos potest velle salvare: illud 
certe nulla ratione comprehendi potest, cur de similibus malis 
hos magis salves quam illos per summam bonitatem, et illos 
magis damnes quam istos per summam iustitiam." 
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ses began with, that God is whatever it is better to be than 
not to be. He sununarizes, "Thus therefore truly You are 
sensible, omnipotent, merciful and impassive, in some sense 
living, knowing, good, blessed, eternal and whatever it is 
better to be than not to be. " 46 The first words here show 
that this is a sununary, and, so, that all the analyses since 
i 
Anselm firsh made the claim that God is whatever it is 
better to be than not to be are only efforts to explain the 
claim. This claim needs explanation, because one could think 
that some good qualities would conflict with others. Anselm 
faces what appear to be particular instances of conflict, 
and works each apparent conflict out. 
The chapter that follows, the twelfth, connects this 
claim--that God is whatever it is better to be than not to 
be--with the earlier claim that God is the highest good, 
needing none other, and thus with the. claims about God's 
being. This might not be inunediately obvious. It is the 
shortest chapter in the Proslogion, and in it Anselm draws a 
single conclusion: God does not have attributes, but is 
attributes: 
But surely whatever You are, You are through nothing 
other than Yourself. You are, thus, the very life by 
which You live, and the knowledge by which You know, and 
the very goodness by which You are good to good and 
46 Ibid., 110: "Sic ergo vere es sensibilis, omnipotens, 
misericors et impassibilis, quemadmodum vivens, sapiens, 
bonus, beatus, aeturnus, et quidquid melius est esse quam non 
esse." 
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evil; and thus [also] concerning similar cases. 47 
To see the connection between this argument and the claim 
that God is the highest good, one need only recall the form 
of the latter in Chapter 5. There, Anselm said that God is 
"the highest of all things," and specified that by adding 
"the one who, alone [of all things] existing through itself, 
made all things from nothing." It is the middle of this 
claim that is interesting now--namely, that God, alone of 
all things, exists per se--because to make this claim is to 
say that God is the being through which God is. Put in this 
form the claim is exactly parallel to the claims that God is 
the life by which God lives, the knowledge by which God 
knows, and the goodness by which God is good. Even if Anselm 
uses the preposition "per" with the accusative in one case 
(existens per se), and uses a relative pronoun in the abla-
tive in the others (for example: ipsa vita gua vivis), it is 
clear enough that this difference is merely verbal. After 
all, Anselm he iptroduces the series of ablatives as expla-
nations of a point he makes with the other construction: 
"whatever You are, You are through nothing other than Your-
self" (non per aliud guam per teipsum). 
What Anselm says about goodness is of special interest. 
What does it mean to say that God is the goodness by which 
4 7 Ibid. , 110: "Sed certe quidquid es, non per aliud quam 
per teipsum. Tu es igitur ipsa vita qua vivis, et sapientia 
qua sapis, et bonitas ipsa qua bonis et malis bonus es; et ita 
de similibus." 
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God is good except to say that God is the one good that is 
good through itself--that God is, simply, the good itself? 
It is a small step to the belief that Anselm says, in the 
preface, he wants to affirm: that God is the highest good, 
needing none other. To see the rigor of the step one need 
only notice that, if one were to respond to Anselm by argu-
ing that to say that God is the goodness through which God 
is good is not quite to identify God as the highest good, he 
can answer with the argument he knows so well: if God is 
less than the highest good, then, if a highest good can be 
thought to be, God is not that than which none greater can 
be thought. 
Now, one might still argue that Anselm has fallen short 
of affirming what he sought to affirm, since he has not yet 
argued that God is the good that all other goods need. But 
it should be remembered that even as.early as Chapter 5, 
when Anselm argues that God is the only being that exists 
per se, he adds that God must also, as the only being who 
exists per se, have created all other things from nothing. 
He writes, "Whatever is not this is less than could be 
thought. " 48 When Anselm goes on in Chapter 12 to say to God, 
"You are the very goodness by which You are good to good and 
evil," that God is, and does not merely possess, each of 
God's qualities, this only specifies the general claim that 
48 Ibid., 104: "Quidquid enim hoc non est, minus est quam 
cogitari possit." 
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God made all things from nothing. What is at least implicit 
in the series of.claims in Chapter 12 is that, as the very 
life, for example, by which God lives, God is also the life 
by which all others live. And so for each of the qualities 
Anselm mentions: God is the knowledge by which God and all 
others know and the goodness by which God and all others are 
good. 
There are also two hints later in the book that this is 
what Anselm means. In the first place, the very next chap-
ter, the thirteenth, concerns the relationship between God 
and other eternal spirits. Anselm brings this question up 
because the existence of unlimited and eternal spirits might 
appear to argue that God is not the source of being, life, 
and goodness for all things. One might think that if a soul, 
for example, is eternal then it cannot have a limit to its 
being, and, so, cannot have been created by God. One might 
think that anything eternal must, somehow, be its own 
source. But Anselm insists that such spirits are eternal 
only compared with bodies. They are, as "created spirits, 
limited compared to" God. 49 
In the second place, Anselm laments in Chapter 17 that 
he is unable to perceive the aspect of God's beauty proper 
to any of his five senses. I will come back to this, but let 
me note already that he concludes by explaining, "You have 
49 Ibid., 110: "An creatus ad te collatus est 
circumscriptus, ad corpus vero incircumscriptus?" 
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these [beauties] in You in Your ineffable way, [You] who 
gave them to the things created by You [so that they might 
have them] in their sensible way. 1150 What is decisive here 
is that, for Anselm, God's being certain qualities is inti-
mately connected with God's giving these qualities to crea-
tures. That God is the goodness by which God is good thus 
implies, especially in the context of the claim that God is 
the only being that exists per se, that God is also the 
goodness by which creatures are good. 
But to see this is to complete the claim that, after 
having affirmed that God truly is, Anselm goes on in the 
next chapters to affirm that God is "the highest good, 
needing none other, that all things need both to be and to 
be well." It shows, in other words, more of what Anselm 
intends to build up, or affirm, even if it does not show 
what this building up or affirming is. 
Let us now, however, come back to the attempt to answer 
this question. The word "astruere" has, as we've seen, a 
range of meanings. It could mean, though not in this case, 
to prove with an argument. It could mean, though again not 
in this case, to support with appeals to empirical examples. 
It could also mean, though not in this case, to refer to 
passages in the Bible or the church fathers. It is still not 
clear what Anselm means by the word. I have shown, however, 
50 Ibid. , 113: "Habes enim haec, Domine Deus, in tuo 
ineffabili modo, qui ea dedisti rebus a te creatis suo 
sensibili modo." 
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that he uses his one argument to do something--whether to 
affirm, to build up, or to prove--with or to a series of 
claims, and also that whatever it is that he does, he does 
in the person of one trying to understand what he believes. 
I have also shown that "to understand" means to see a whole 
at once. Perhaps his desire for a single argument is nothing 
but the natural consequence of what understanding means to 
him. Perhaps he seeks his one argument in order to see his 
various beliefs about God in their connectedness, as a 
single whole--that is to understand them. 
Even this supposition, though, fails to specify com-
pletely what Anselm means by "astruere." It does, however, 
suggest two alternatives. On the one hand, the verb could 
have a nearly literal sense: it could mean "build up" in the 
sense that Anselm uses his one argument to build various 
beliefs into a single whole much in the way a mason builds 
up one house out of many bricks. Each belief is one brick, 
and every time Anselm shows that his one argument affirms it 
he adds that belief to the whole that he can see at a 
glance. 
But this simple account has at least three problems. 
First, it runs slightly against the other occurrences of the 
verb: in each case in which astruere involves an argument, 
the argument seems to add to a belief rather than to connect 
several beliefs. Second, it leaves tbe relationship between 
the argument that builds and the beliefs that are its bricks 
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undetermined: does the argument prove the belief, does it 
illuminate it, or is something else at work? Third, it 
suggests that there is some complex structure, built by the 
analysis of the argument, that one is supposed to be able to 
see at one gaze. 
On the other hand, we could use my characterization of 
the analyses that concern the being of God in order to 
understand the word "astruere." Those analyses make the most 
sense understood as explorations, beginning with a sense of 
God's presence, that show how Anselm's one argument, as an 
expression of that sense, displays that God is in the very 
manner in which Anselm believes God to be. This is not to 
say that Anselm sets out to "prove" that God is in just that 
manner if this would be to suggest that Anselm sets out to 
establish his belief as true--as though it were a controver-
sial claim. Anselm aims rather to show how a belief that he 
already has is connected to his one argument, how his one 
argument affirms, or agrees with, this belief. 
If this account characterizes the relationship, in each 
case, between the argument and the various beliefs that 
Anselm holds even without the argument, then the role of 
Anselm's argument is to express the experience of God's 
presence in a manner that allows him to see everything he 
holds about divine substance in one gaze, not by building 
those beliefs into one structure, but by seeing how one way 
of expressing God's presence, one short argument, touches 
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them all. 
The decisive moments of the first part of the Proslogion 
are thus the affirmations that I have pointed to. In each 
case, Anselm shows how he can see, in his experience of 
God's presence, some belief that he holds about divine 
substance. He does so by showing how the belief is affirmed 
by the argument that expresses God's presence. This is to 
say: Anselm begins with an experience of God's presence; he 
expresses the "object" of that experience when he says that 
God is "that than which a greater cartnot be thought"; by 
analyzing this "one argument" he shows how his particular 
beliefs about God each are affirmed by it. He does not 
establish that these beliefs are true. He does not weave his 
beliefs together, or assemble them into a whole. He shows 
that one way of expressing what he experiences when he 
experiences the presence of God affirms whatever he believes 
about God. By doing so he seeks to see all that he believes 
concerning God at once, and this is what it means to seek to 
understand. 
But this account still leaves serious problems. It only 
explains one half of the Proslogion. I will argue that it 
could not serve as an account of the book as a whole. In 
fact, what Anselm goes on to say seems to undermine this 
account: he will discover that he has not found God, that 
his argument has not enabled him to understand, because what 
God is cannot be expressed in an argument, cannot be thought 
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at all. I will now have to turn to these difficulties. 
CHAPTER 5 
Reasoning, Celebration, and Prayer 
My effort to understand the role that Anselm's argument 
plays within the Proslogion has thus far been a process of 
elimination. I began by assuming that the second and third 
chapters are Anselm's polemical attempt to establish that 
God exists. Two sorts of considerations weighed against this 
assumption. 
On one hand, Anselm's argument fails if understood in 
this way. An anaiysis of the case made for the ontological 
argument by Malcolm and Plantinga suggests that it depends 
on a controversial assumption that God is possible. Malcolm 
and Plantinga show that the argument can prove that if God 
is possible, then God must be, and each describes reasons 
for a presumption that God is possible. Neither man, howev-
er, understands himself to have established anything beyond 
a presumption, and Plantinga claims no more than that some 
people could have reason to assume that God can be. For 
these authors, this may be enough. They aim to show no more 
that the belief in God is not irrational, and therefore need 
only point out, as Malcolm does, that to expect a general 
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proof that God is possible is to expect too much. 1 But even 
if we were to assume that Anselm's intent is polemical, it 
would be hard to believe that the intent of his polemics was 
to show that his faith is not irrational. If his intent was 
polemical at all, it would make more sense to assume that he 
sought to prove that God exists. 
On the other hand, there is evidence in Anselm's text 
that this was not his aim. His designs were different from 
those of the various thinkers who have tried to turn his 
argument into a proof. I noted first that Anselm begins his 
argument by affirming God's presence; next, that his inter-
locutor is not so much an atheist as a foolish and willful 
aspect of himself; and then, that his argument treats not of 
the fact of God's existence but of the manner of God's 
being. 
My second account still assumed, despite this third 
point, that Anselm's argument is an attempt to prove the 
existence of God, but it also took seriously the fact that 
Anselm begins his argument from an experience of God's 
presence. It took the argument to be an argument from expe-
rience for the existence of God, and thus solved the main 
challenge to the rigor of the ontological argument. If, 
after all, the argument begins with an experience that God 
is present, it is no longer controversial to assume that God 
is possible. 
1 Malcolm, 157. 
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This account, however, raised another problem. It forced 
us to ask what the function of such an argument could be. 
This is to ask what an argument for God's existence that is 
from experience could mean. A more careful look at the words 
that Anselm uses, together with a consideration of the range 
of analyses of which the ones concerning God's existence are 
just a part, pointed towards an answer: Anselm's argument is 
his attempt to understand all that he believes about divine 
substance--about the unique manner of its being and about 
all the qualities that it is. He uses his argument in an 
attempt to see all his beliefs as a whole, and to see them 
at a glance. As Anselm says, in words he finds in the Bible, 
his argument is an attempt to see God's face. 
This conclusion is not original •. It is closely related 
to the interpretation of the book suggested by Anselm Stolz. 
I have already discussed one part of his position--his 
understanding of "vere esse"--but I should also describe his 
view of the whole. Stolz concludes that the book is Anselm's 
search for a mystical experience of God. Anselm would like, 
he writes, "to be led, through the reflection on God and his 
qualities, to the mystical experience of God." 2 My interpre-
tation so far has suggested that Stolz may be right. It is 
important to recognize, however, that such a conclusion does 
2 Stolz, 18: "AuBerdem will Anselm, wie vor allem aus 
Kap. 17 ersichtlich ist, durch das Nachsinnen Uber Gott und 
seine Eigenschaften zur mystischen Gotteserfahrung geflihrt 
werden." 
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not, by itself, take us very far. Stolz's interpretation is 
based on his conviction that Anselm belongs in a particular 
religious tradition, rooted in the writings of Augustine and 
Gregory the Great. 3 There is nothing wrong with such an 
approach, and nothing false about the conclusions it leads 
to, but it does not answer the question as to the role 
Anselm's argument and his analyses of that argument play 
within his search--even if it does tell us what that search 
is a search for. 
Thus, though I insist that Anselm's work begins from an 
experience of God, and agree that Anselm also seeks an expe-
rience of God, I must still determine how his argument 
serves that end. When I concluded that Anselm's argument 
might be a means of searching for a vision of God, I immedi-
ately suggested that this account would have problems of its 
own. On one hand, it is hard to believe that Anselm expects 
his argument to bring him to a vision of God. On the other, 
the account at best explains only the first half of the 
book. In the middle of the book, Anselm shows that he does 
not believe that his argument has given him or can give him 
what he seeks. Let us now consider how Anselm faces the 
limits of the analytical thinking, the reasoning, he employs 
through Chapter 13. 
At the beginning of Chapter 14, Anselm asks himself a 
striking question: 
3 Ibid. 
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But have you, my soul, found what you were seeking? 
You were seeking God, and you found Him to be a certain 
highest of all, than which nothing better can be 
thought, and. this to be life itself, light, wisdom, 
goodness, eternal blessedness and blessed eternity, and 
this to be everywhere and always. If you have not found 
your God, how is He.what you have found and what you 
have understood Him to be with such certain truth and 
such true certainty? 
If, however, you have found [God], why is it that 
you do not feel what you have found? 4 
And he then turns the question towards God, "Why does my 
soul not feel You, Lord God, if it has found You?" 5 
Anselm has discovered himself to be in a quandary. He is 
confident that his analyses thus far are correct--he says 
that they are true and certain--but he does not feel their 
object. He is certain that he has understood various things 
about God, certain that he has found God, but he realizes 
that he does not· feel the God he has found. This is particu-
larly strange because we found that Anselm begins from a 
sense--we might say a feeling--of God's presence. In light 
of his beginning, how does Anselm arrive at a moment at 
which he questions whether he has found God? 
Let us consider first how Anselm arrives at this dilem-
4 Anselm, 111: "An invenisti, anima mea, quod quaerebas? 
Quaerebas Deum, et invenisti eum esse quiddam summum omnium, 
quo nihil melius cogitari potest; et hoc esse ipsam vitam, 
lucem, sapientiam, bonitatem, aeternam beatitudinem et beatam 
aeternitatem; et hoc esse ubique et semper. Nam si non 
invenisti Deum tuum: quomodo est ille hoc quod invenisti, et 
quod illum tam certa veritate et vera certitudine 
intellixisti? 
Si vero invenisti: quid est, quod non sentis quod 
invenisti?" 
5 Ibid.: "Cur non te sentit, Domine Deus, anima mea, si 
invenit te?" 
110 
ma, and then where the dilemma leaves him. We will then be 
in a position to see the direction that the dilemma gives 
the remainder of his book and what this direction implies 
for the attempt to understand the role of his argument in 
the work as a whole. First, however, I will argue that the 
dilemma arises for Anselm because the conclusions he comes 
to in his discussion of God's qualities force him to ask 
himself whether he has found God. I will then argue that, in 
response to this self-questioning, Anselm's argument takes 
on a critical force. It becomes, in part, an argument about 
the limit of his reasoning. Finally, I will show how this 
realization leads Anselm to employ thinking in other ways. 
First, then, let me describe how Anselm arrives at his 
dilemma. The question he asks his soul--whether it has found 
what it was searching for--may seem sudden, but it has been 
prepared by the discussion of divine attributes that pre-
cedes it. Through the analyses in Chapters 6, 7, and 8, a 
recognition emerges that God does not appear to Anselm as 
God is in se. In Chapter 6, Anselm explains how God could be 
sensible though incorporeal, and in Chapter 7, how God could 
be omnipotent though incapable of many things. In each case, 
Anselm's explanation hinges on the recognition that words 
must be used with special care when they describe God. He 
argues that God can be said to be sensible, because although 
God does not perceive through the five senses, to sense is 
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"nothing but to come to know, " 6 and what we know by means of 
the senses God knows by the means that are God's. He argues 
that God can be said to be unable to do many things, because 
what we mean by God's inability is an inability to do wrong, 
which is, more precisely, not a limit but a strength. 
Anselm takes this line of discovery a step farther in 
Chapter 8. It is not merely that words have special meanings 
when one tries to talk about God. One's sense of God, the 
sense one can strive to express in words, is distinct from 
what God is. The distinction becomes an issue as Anselm 
tries to explain how it is that God could be merciful and 
impassive. He insists that since God is impassive, God could 
not be merciful, "For if You are impassive, You feel no 
compassion; if You feel no compassion, then Your heart is 
not wretched out of compassion for the wretched--which is 
what it means to be merciful." 7 But although God cannot be 
merciful, one can feel mercy from God. Anselm explains, "You 
are indeed (merciful] according to our sense, and not ac-
cording to Yours. For when You look upon us who are wretch-
ed, we feel the effect of mercy, but You do not feel the 
6 Ibid., 105·: "Sed si sentire non nisi cognoscere aut non 
n1s1 ad cognoscendum est." 
7 Ibid., 106: "Nam si es impassibilis, non compateris; si 
non compateris, non est tibi mi serum cor ex compassione 
miseri, quod est esse misercordem." 
Our word "merciful" loses the force of the argument 
carried by Anselm's Latin. Anselm's point is that God cannot 
not feel our suffering, and so that God's heart cannot be 
wretched (mi serum cor) • But "merciful" ( misercors) means 
"wretched heart." 
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affect." 8 In other words, one's sense of God's presence can 
serve as consolation even if God does not suffer in se. God 
is impassive, but seems compassionate. Anselm thus acknowl-
edges a distinction between what God is and how God seems. 
It is, then, in a context set by this distinction that 
Anselm goes on to ask himself whether he has found God. For 
though his analyses have led him to draw a range of conclu-
sions concerning God, he cannot, in light of this distinc-
tion, assume that his conclusions touch upon anything more 
than how God seems to be. Anselm must ask whether he has 
come to see, or understand, God, and he begins Chapter 14 
with just this question. 
As he proceeds to answer the question, he shows no lack 
of confidence that the analyses he has gone through thus far 
are correct. We already saw that he describes what he has 
found as having been found by "certain truth and true cer-
tainty." Anselm will reject nothing he has said in the 
book's first thirteen chapters. With such confidence he can 
argue that he must have seen God in some sense: 
If [my soul] has not found You, whom did it find to be 
light and truth? For how could it have understood this 
except by seeing light and truth? Or could it have 
understood anything at all about You except through Your 
light and Your truth? If, therefore, it sees light and 
truth, it sees You. If it does not see You, it sees 
8 Ibid.: "Es quippe secundum nostrum sensum, et non es 
secundum tu um. Etenim cum tu re spic is nos miseros, nos 
sentimus misericordis effectum, tu non sentis affectum." 
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neither light nor truth. 9 
Because Anselm believes that God is light and truth, and 
because he believes that he could only have seen this by 
seeing light and truth, Anselm concludes that he either must 
have seen God or· not have seen light and truth at all. One 
might expect him to conclude the latter in the face of his 
feeling that he has not found God, but instead he finds a 
middle way. He concludes that his soul has seen something of 
God, even if it has not seen God as God is, "Or is truth and 
light what it has seen, and nonetheless it has not seen You, 
because it has seen You in a sense, but has not seen You 
just as You are?" 10 In other words, even if Anselm must 
admit that he can only see God as God seems, he need not 
conclude, in any simple way, that he has not seen God. For 
Anselm, to see God as God seems is indeed to see God, but to 
see God only in a sense. 
The chapter continues with Anselm's insistence that his 
inability to see God must be ascribed both to God's great-
ness and to his own limitation, and ends with a series of 
exclamations expressing wonder at God's greatness. Anselm 
9 Ibid., 111: "An non invenit, quern invenit esse lucem et 
veritatem? Quomodo namque intellixit hoc, nisi videndo lucem 
et veritatem? Aut potuit omnino aliquid intelligere de te, 
nisi per lucem tuam et veritatem tuam? Si ergo vidit lucem et 
veritatem, vidit te. Si non vidit te, non vidit lucem nee 
veritatem." 
10 Ibid.: "An et veritas et lux est quod vidit, et tamen 
nondum te vidit, quia vidit te aliquatenus, sed non vidit te 
sicuti es?" 
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phrases the exclamations as questions about the extent of 
that greatness, questions that he can answer in one short 
sentence: God's greatness is "surely more than can be under-
stood by a creature." 11 
This conclusion leads to the most curious chapter in the 
whole work. In Chapter 15, Anselm shows that God cannot be 
thought. To do so he uses the same reasoning he has used 
over and over already: 
Therefore, Lord, not only are You that than which a 
greater cannot be thought, but You are something greater 
than could be thought. For since something of this kind 
can be thought to be, if You are not this very thing, 
something can be thought [that is] greater than You--
which cannot happen. 12 
Few of those who analyze Anselm's argument as an attempt 
to prove the existence of God take note of this chapter. I 
pointed to an example of someone who.does not when I dis-
cuss.ed how Plantinga understands Anselm's claim that some-
thing can be thought. Plantinga, we saw, understands it to 
ref er to a state of affairs and to mean that the state of 
affairs is logically possible. Anselm's Chapter 15 shows 
11 Ibid., 112: "Quanta namque est lux illa, de qua micat 
omne verum, quod rationali menti lucet! Quam ampla est illa 
veritas, in qua est omne quod verum est et extra quam non nisi 
nihil et falsum est! Quam immensa est, quae uno intuito videt, 
quaecumque facta sunt, et a quo et per quern et quomodo de 
nihilo facta sunt! Quid puritatis, quid simplicitatis, quid 
certitudinis et splendoris ibi est! Certe plus quam a creatura 
valeat intelligi." 
12 Ibid.: "Ergo, Domine, non solum es quo maius cogitari 
neguit, sed es quiddam maius quam cogitari possit. Quoniam 
namque valet cogitari esse aliquid huiusmodi: si tu non es hoc 
ipsum, potest cogitari maius te~ quod fieri nequit." 
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that this could not be the case. If it were, one would be 
forced to understand the argument here as a claim that God 
is so great as to be logically impossible. Aside from the 
particular difficulty this interpretation would present for 
the attempt to understand Anselm's claim that "a being of 
this kind can be thought to be," such an interpretation 
seems most unlikely. How likely is it, after all, that 
Anselm understood himself to have shown in Chapter 15 that 
God is impossible? 
Charlesworth takes slightly more account of the passage. 
In his commentary on the chapter, he points out that it is 
important, and summarizes Anselm's claim, "Here, in this 
important discussion, St. Anselm reminds us that, even if we 
understand God to be 'that than which nothing greater can be 
thought,' we do not thereby have a positive or determinate 
knowledge of God." 13 What Charlesworth does not explain is 
why the chapter is important: he makes no effort to consider 
its role in the work as a whole. His commitment to the claim 
that the early chapters are an attempt to prove God's exis-
tence closes him to the rest of the book. He devotes less 
than a page of commentary to the last eleven chapters, and 
concludes his few remarks on Chapter 15 by suggesting that 
Anselm might just as well have left the question in the 
hands of later, better theoretically equipped minds, "To 
deal adequately with this whole question St. Anselm would of 
13 Charlesworth, 81. 
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course need a theory of analogical predication, such as 
Aquinas was to develop later. " 14 
At least one interpreter, however, has taken careful 
stock of the passage, and I shall take my direction, if not 
my conclusion, from him. Jean-Luc Marion discusses this part 
of Anselm's analysis in the course of showing that Anselm's 
argument for the existence of God is not ontological. 15 
Marion emphasizes the sense in which Chapter 15 demonstrates 
the inadequacy of the attempt to conceptualize, or think, 
God. His surprising conclusion makes Anselm out to be some-
thing of a proto-Kantian: 
If, according to Kant, the word "transcendental" 
means ••• never a relation of thought with things, but 
only with our power [or faculty] of thinking, then we 
must conclude paradoxically that the argument of Anselm 
aims at a transcendent but inaccessible item only 
through the transcendental test of our cogitatio. 16 
Marion adds that such prominent critics of the argument as 
Kant and Thomas Aquinas miss the point because they fail to 
see its critical character. He writes of Kant that "it is 
not the least paradoxical that Kant was the first to miss 
the point and to criticize Anselm as if he had not been 
critical--in Kant's very sense--as Kant himself was supposed 
14 Ibid. 
15 See also: Adriaan Peperzak, "Anselm's Proslogion and 
its Hegelian Interpretation," trans. Steven Werlin, The St. 
John's Review, 42, no. 1 (1993): 59-77. 
16 Jean-Luc Marion, "Is the Ontological Argument Ontologi-
cal?" Journal of the History of Philosophy 30, no. 2 (April 
1992): 209. 
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to be. " 17 And even though he writes that Kant was the first 
to make the mistake, he nonetheless goes on to judge Thomas 
along similar lines: 
The whole burden of the Thomistic refutation rests upon 
the fact that God is not obviously known by us, ••• so 
that we are deprived of any concept of him; therefore 
Thomas strongly confirms our interpretation of Anselm's 
argument. 18 
Marion notes in summary that it is, for Anselm, precisely 
the impossibility of forming a concept of God that proves 
that God exists: 
Therefore Anselm's argument infers God's existence from 
the very impossibility of producing any concept of God 
or His essence, according to a critical and transcenden-
tal examination of the limits of our power of think-
ing .19 
I disagree with Marion on several levels: I do not think 
that Anselm's argument is exclusively or even primarily 
critical, nor that it is an argument for the existence of 
God. But Marion's point should be well taken, even if it 
does not take us very far. First of all, it is well worth 
wondering what a detailed reconstruction of the argument, so 
conceived, would look like. One way of understanding it 
would be more Cartesian than Kantian: it might be that 
Anselm begins with an experience of the presence of God and 
then deduces that God must exist in fact, and not merely in 
his own thought, by showing that God could not exist in his 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid., 213. 
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own thought. The argument would thus foreshadow the one Des-
cartes makes on the basis of the presence of the idea of the 
infinite in the finite mind. 20 
But though Marion's point should be well taken, it 
cannot and should not be taken too far, even if the 
argument's critical aspect plays an important role in the 
work as a whole •. Anselm does insist in Chapter 15 that God 
cannot be thought, but this does not mean, as Marion sug-
gests, that he thinks of the impossibility of thinking God 
as a proof that God exists. In the first place, Anselm draws 
no such conclusion from Chapter 15. In fact, there is no 
talk that could be interpreted as though it concerned the 
existence of God after the first few chapters of the book. 
In the second place, none of the talk of God's being in the 
Proslogion, even the analyses of Chapters 2 and 3, is aimed 
by Anselm at proving that God exists. In the third place, 
Marion's exclusive emphasis on the critical aspect of the 
argument in Chapter 15 comes at a price: he does not attend 
to Anselm's parallel insistence that he also has come to see 
God. 
If, then, Chapter 15 is not, as Marion suggests, the 
final proof that God exists, I must ask what it is. The 
first thing to consider is its relation to what precedes it, 
in Chapter 14 and before, if for no other reason than be-
cause this will provide the final evidence for my early 
20 See: Meditations on the First Philosophy. 
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claim that "astruere" does not mean "to prove." 
The first word of Chapter 15, "therefore" (ergo), marks 
it as a conclusion that follows on the last words of Chapter 
14. Though one should not exaggerate this--"ergo" does not 
here mean what it would mean in Euclid or Copi--it does 
suggest that the analysis it introduces follows upon the 
claim that precedes it. That claim summarizes the discovery 
Anselm made, in Chapter 14, that though he has found God in 
a sense, he must also admit that he has not found God. God, 
he concludes, must "surely be more than could be understood 
by a creature. " 21 
The analysis Anselm undertakes in Chapter 15 does not so 
much prove a new conclusion as affirm this discovery. The 
force of what he writes at the end of Chapter 14 is clear 
enough: God is too great to understand. But it is possible 
to say more about the understanding that connects this 
conclusion to the conclusion that God cannot be thought and 
the analysis by which he comes to this conclusion. We saw 
already that Anselm writes in Chapter 4 that something can 
be thought in either of two ways, either verbally or accord-
ing to an understanding of the thing . (res) to be thought. 22 
Anselm thus implies that any thinking that is not merely 
21 Anselm, 112: "Certe plus quam a creatura valeat 
intelligi." 
22 Anselm, 103: "Aliter enim cogitatur res, cum vox earn 
significans cogitatur, aliter cum id ipsum quod res est 
intelligitur." 
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verbal relies on. some understanding. That God cannot be 
understood thus entails that God cannot be thought, and the 
analysis of Chapter 15 confirms or explores this conclusion. 
Thus, it is even more clear here than elsewhere that "to 
affirm" (astruere) does not have a polemical sense. It does 
not mean "to demonstrate" or "to prove." The claim that God 
cannot be thought is a conclusion that follows directly upon 
another Anselm has just come to: that God cannot be under-
stood. He does not draw that conclusion by means of an 
analysis of his argument. The argument does not even appear 
in Chapter 14. The conclusion arises out of Anselm's reflec-
tion on the feeling he has that his argument has not enabled 
him to see God as he would like to. This feeling has arisen 
in him in the course of his reflections on his argument. 
Just as the work as a whole begins with Anselm's experience 
that God is present to him, this second part of the work 
begins with the experience that he has not come to under-
stand God, has not seen God just as God is, has not seen 
God's face. 
But it is important not to over-simply. Anselm's posi-
tion in Chapter 14 does suggest, in general, that whatever 
we fail to understand we shall also be unable to think. He 
has not, however, claimed that he is unable to understand 
God at all. He labels Chapter 14, "In What Way and Why God 
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is Seen and Not Seen By Those Seeking Him. " 23 To the extent 
to which God is seen, God can be thought, and just this 
thinking has been Anselm's task through the first half of 
the Proslogion. He will never in the course of the latter 
part of the work repudiate the progress he has made. 
At the same time, an important moment in that progress 
is the discovery of the difference between the way God seems 
to us and the way God is. Anselm realizes that he has not 
yet seen God as God is, and he shows that his one argument 
can affirm even this realization. We shall see that this 
realization becomes the driving force for the additional 
progress Anselm goes on to make. 
To say, however, that Anselm's argument affirms what he 
believes is not to say that the reasoning in Chapter 15 
simply confirms something Anselm already knows, as though 
Anselm were to make knowledge that is less firm firmer by 
appealing to the_ argument. Anselm's lament in Chapter 14 
shows that reflection on his experience has already entirely 
convinced him that the analyses of his argument have not 
brought him to see God's face. He has found God, but only in 
the limited sense that he there suggests. This knowledge 
that his discovery is limited need not be made more firm. 
What the analysis of Chapter 15 does show is that Anselm 
can use his one argument to show everything he believes 
23 Anselm, 111: "Quomodo et cur videtur et non videtur 
Deus a quaerentibus eum." 
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about divine substance--including his belief that divine 
substance is beyond whatever he believes. Here, belief is 
expressed in a sort of thinking. Anselm has expressed what 
he believes in a series of statements he can think, or say 
in his heart, about God. Anselm has used his argument in an 
attempt to see God, in one glance, as what God is, by show-
ing how his one argument combines all his various beliefs. 
But Chapter 14 expresses his feeling that he must fail to do 
so, and Chapter 15 shows that his one argument affirms even 
this belief. Anselm's one argument entails a criticism that 
turns it back on itself. 
One can confirm that much of the force of Anselm's argu-
ment in Chapter 15 is critical by considering the chapters 
that immediately follow it. Though those chapters also show 
that his argument is not merely critical, Anselm dwells on 
his failure to see God. He does so even as he also explains 
what he means in Chapter 14 when he says that he sees God to 
some extent (aliguatenus). 
After he has considered the sense in which his argument 
fails, Anselm continues. Though he discovers that analyzing 
his argument enables him to see that his ability to see God 
by means of his argument is limited, he does not conclude 
his Proslogion. In Chapter 18, he returns to his search for 
God. The recognition of that limit leads to a shift in the 
nature of Anselm's thinking through the last chapters of the 
Proslogion. His thinking shifts twice, in fact. We shall see 
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that his transformed thinking takes him farther than the 
analysis of his argument than his reasoning can. To empha-
size, as Marion does, that what Anselm discovers by the 
analysis of his argument is that God cannot be thought may 
be to say something true, but it does not say enough. It is 
necessary to chart the course on which the discovery of his 
argument's limit leads Anselm, not only in order to under-
stand the work as a whole, but to understand the real force 
of the beginning of the work as well. If our guiding ques-
tion is how Anselm attempts to use thinking in order to 
understand, then we must consider how his discovery of the 
limit of that thinking which is characterized by analysis of 
his one argument leads him to think of thinking in different 
ways. After discovering the limit of reasoning, Anselm turns 
to thinking that he calls "coniectatio" 24 and then to think-
ing that is prayer. 
Before considering those shifts, let me review what I 
have argued about the character of the first manner of 
Anselm's thought. I have referred several times to the 
analysis of his one argument, but it is important to under-
stand what this means. 
Anselm begins the Proslogion with a sense of God's pres-
ence. He attempts to express what he experiences in a state-
ment: "something than which nothing greater could be 
24 See the title of Chapter 24, "Coniectatio, -guale et 
quantum sit hoc bonum." 
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thought" (aliguid quo nihil maius cogitari possit). The 
wording of the statement varies through the book. Sometimes 
Anselm says "that" (id) instead of "something" (aliguid), 
sometimes he says "better" (melius) instead of "greater" 
(maius), and he has several ways of saying either that 
nothing greater can be thought or that something greater 
cannot be thought. All his formulations suggest the one 
argument he uses throughout the first half of the book: if 
God's being is not true, for example, then God is not that 
than which none greater can be thought. Anselm takes up 
various beliefs about God, and analyzes his one argument in 
order to show how it affirms them each. Here, "analyze" 
means that he works out what his argument implies, works out 
how it implies each of the beliefs he holds about God. He 
does so in order to show that each belief is, in a sense, 
present in his argument and thus to show that to understand 
the words of his argument is to see them all at a glance, 
and thus to see God. 
Eventually he discovers, by reflecting on what his 
argument has revealed to him, that the effort does not bring 
him to see God, and he affirms even this discovery by appeal 
to the very same argument. He explains that the qualities 
his argument affirms in God are many, so that he cannot see 
them "in a single simultaneous gaze" (uno simul intuitu), 
even though the same one argument also affirms that they are 
indivisibly one in God. Anselm's failure is a failure to 
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express all that God is. Anselm's one argument may remain 
the same throughout the analyses that use it, but those 
analyses take time. One follows another. The argument itself 
also takes time. Word follows word. Words cannot express 
what God is because God's utter simplicity sets God apart. 
Anselm emphasizes: "You are unity itself, not divisible by 
any understanding. 1125 
Having failed to say what God is, Anselm attempts to ask 
how good God must be. Anselm calls this "coniectatio," and 
that is how he labels Chapter 24. In it, Anselm exhorts 
himself, one more time, to think, "Awaken now, my soul, and 
lift up your whole understanding, and think, as much as you 
can, what sort and how great is that good." 26 This he writes 
immediately after declaring, at the end of Chapter 23, just 
what good he has in mind, "But one thing is necessary. But 
this is that one necessary thing, in which is every good, 
or, rather, which is every [good] and the one [good] and the 
whole [good] and· the only good. " 27 The one necessary thing, 
the one good he has in mind, is, of course, God. His 
coniectatio, then, is an attempt to think God by asking what 
25 Anselm, 114: "tu es ipsa unitas, nullo intellectu 
divisibilis." 
26 Anselm, 117: "Excita nunc, anima mea, et erige totum 
intellectum tuum, et cogita, quantum potes, quale et quantum 
sit illud bonum." 
27 Ibid.: "Porro unum est necessarium. Porro hoc est illud 
unum necessarium, in quo est omne bonum, immo quod est omne et 
unum et totum et solum bonum." 
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sort of good and how great a good God is. 
It is tempting to translate his word, "coniectatio" with 
our word "conjecture." Standard translations of the 
Proslogion do just this. But that word is deceiving because 
it generally means something like "guess." In addition, 
though "conjecture" might strike us as a close cognate of 
Anselm's word, there is another Latin word closer to "con-
jecture" than Anselm's word: "coniectura." This word does 
mean a conjecture or a guess. 
I have chosen to translate Anselm's word as "celebra-
tion." This has advantages and disadvantages, and I should 
present them right now. We use our verb, "to celebrate," in 
two ways: intransitively and transitively. Each way express-
es an aspect of Anselm's coniectatio. As an intransitive 
verb, "to celebrate" means to rejoice. As such, the word 
well captures the tone of this part of the Proslogion. 
Chapters 24 and 25 are filled with the words that mean 
delight and delightful (delectation and delectibile), plea-
sure and pleasant (iucunditas and iucundus), and enjoy 
(fruor). Anselm is here rejoicing or celebrating. 
As a transitive verb, "to celebrate" emphasizes that in 
my rejoicing I am turning my attention to something in 
particular that is the object of my rejoicing. When, for 
example, I celebrate Passover, I joyfully turn my attention 
to God's gift of freedom from Pharaoh for the children of 
Israel. When I celebrate a friend's birthday, I joyfully 
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turn my attention to that friend. In this respect as well, 
"celebration" captures an aspect of Anselm's coniectatio. In 
fact, Anselm's coniectatio is just this: his attempt to turn 
his attention joyfully toward God. 
The translation I have chosen, however, does present 
problems. First, it is not a usual translation for Anselm's 
word. Standard translations use "conjecture." Second, the 
translation is jarring: I will insist that Anselm's celebra-
tion is a form of thinking, and in doing so I surely strain 
English usage--perhaps too far. Finally, it has no histori-
cal or etymological connection to Anselm's word--none, at 
least, that I know of. But I am willing to accept these 
difficulties. The question at issue for me is just how to 
characterize thinking, and so for me to use a word that 
draws attention to itself may be, in the end, an advantage. 
I will consider Anselm's celebration from two sides: how 
Anselm prepares it in the chapters leading up to it, and its 
character as a form of thinking. Anselm prepares it in a 
series of chapters that aim at identifying God as the one 
good. This identification takes its departure from a summary 
that Anselm gives in Chapter 18 as a response to the discov-
ery that he has not found God, "What are You, Lord, what are 
You? What does my heart understand You to be? Surely You are 
life, You are wisdom, You are truth, You are goodness, You 
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are beauty, You are eternity, and You are every true 
good." 28 Anselm goes on to point out a difficulty that this 
summary presents. He writes, as we have already seen, "These 
are many. My narrow understanding cannot see so many at once 
in one gaze in order to delight in all at once." 29 
Anselm faces the difficulty in the very same chapter by 
showing that God.must be one in the strongest sense, refer-
ring to his one argument one last time to argue that neither 
God nor God's eternity has any parts: 
For whatever has been connected of parts is not entirely 
one, but is in a certain sense more and different from 
itself, and can be dissolved either by an action or by 
the understanding. These things are foreign to You, than 
whom nothing better can be thought. 30 
Anselm concludes that to say that God is one, to say that 
God is indivisible whether considered spatially or temporal-
ly, is to say that all of God is wholly present at every 
place and at every time; "Since, therefore, neither You nor 
Your eternity, which You are, have parts, there is no part 
of You or Your eternity anywhere or ever, but all of You is 
28 Ibid., 114: "Quid es, Domine, quid es, quid te 
intelliget cor meum? Certe vita es, sapientia es, veritas es, 
bonitas es, beatitude es, aeternitas es, et omne verum bonum 
es." 
29 Ibid.: 
intellectus meus 
delectetur." 
"Multa 
tot 
sunt haec, non 
uno simul videre, 
potest angustus 
ut omnibus simul 
30 Ibid.: "Nam quidquid partibus est iunctum, non est 
omnino unum, sed quodam modo plura et diversum a seipso, et 
vel ~ctu vel intellectu dissolvi potest; quae aliena sunt a 
te, quo nihil melius cogitari potest." 
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everywhere and all of Your eternity is always. " 31 
The question of God's unity thus turns Anselm's thinking 
to the question of God's relation to space and to time. In 
Chapter 19, he argues that God is neither in space nor in 
time, but rather that space and time are in God, and in 
Chapter 20 he argues that God is before and beyond all other 
things, whether those things are transitory or eternal. From 
all this he concludes, in Chapter 22, that God is not only 
one, but is also unique: 
Therefore, Lord, You alone are what You are, and You are 
who You are. For what is one thing as a whole and anoth-
er in parts, and in which there is something mutable, is 
not entirely what it is. And what begins from not being 
and can be thought not to be, and (what) returns to not 
being unless it subsists through another, and what has a 
"having been" that it is not now and a "will be" that it 
not yet is: this is not strictly and absolutely. You, 
however, are what You are, because, whatever You are at 
any time or in any way, this You are wholly and al-
ways. 32 
He then reviews his progress so far, and closes by 
echoing his preface to say what he would like to show: God 
31 Ibid., 115: "Quoniam ergo nee tu habes partes nee tua 
aeternitas, quae· tu es: nusquam et numquam est pars tua aut 
aeternitas tuae, sed ubique totus es, et aeternitas tua tota 
semper." 
32 Ibid., 116: "Tu solus ergo, Domine, es quod es, et tu 
es qui es. Nam quod aliud est in toto et aliud in partibus, et 
in quo aliquid est mutibile, non omnino est quod est. Et quod 
incipit a non esse et potest cogitari non esse et, nisi per 
aliud subsistat, redit in non esse; et quod habet fuisse quod 
iam non est, et futurum esse quod nondum est; id non est 
proprie et absolute. Tu vero es quos es; quia quidquid 
aliquando aut aliquo modo es, hoc totus et semper es." 
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is, he writes, the one who "strictly and simply is, "33 who 
is all of the various qualities he has already discussed, 
and is nevertheless nothing but "the one and highest good." 
He confesses to God, "You [are the one], entirely sufficient 
to Yourself, needing nothing, whom all things need in order 
to be and to be well. " 34 At the end of Chapter 2 3, after he 
has identified this unique God as God the trinity, Anselm 
summarizes the line he has been pursuing by identifying God, 
as we have seen, as, "the one necessary thing, in which is 
every good, or, rather, which is every [good] and the one 
[good] and the whole [good] and the only good." 35 
Anselm is now ready to begin his celebration. He does so 
in Chapter 24, with an exhortation to his soul to consider 
the one necessary good that he has just identified, "Awaken 
now, my soul, and lift up your whole understanding, and 
think, as much as you can, what sort and how great is that 
33 It is worth mentioning that this is the final and 
decisive evidence that Stolz is right in his interpretation of 
"vere esse." Here Anselm says explicitly that God is the only 
one that truly is. 
34 Ibid., 116-7: "Et tu es qui proprie et simpliciter es; 
quia nee habes fuisse aut futurum esse, sed tantum praesens 
esse, nee potes cogitari aliquando non esse. Et vita es et lux 
et sapientia et _beatitudo et aeternitas et multa huiusmodi 
bona, et tamen non es nisi unum et summum bonum; tu, tibi 
omnino sufficiens, nullo indigens, quo omnia indigent ut sint, 
et ut bene sint." 
35 Ibid., 117: "Porro unum est necessarium. Porro hoc est 
illud unum necessarium, in quo est omne bonum, immo quod est 
omne et unum et totum et solum bonum." 
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good." 36 Though he here tells his soul to think, the activi-
ty he intends is different from the thinking he has shown us 
so far. Here, he asks his soul to consider a series of ques-
tions. He does not attempt to answer any of them. Each 
question presents one way to celebrate God's goodness. 
Whereas he sought, in the first half of the book, to express 
the object of his thinking by analysis of his argument, he 
does not attempt to do so here. Insofar as he does attempt 
to express the object of the thinking that celebrates, its 
expression is in the identification of God as the good he 
will wonder at. This identification is the preparation for 
his celebration, not the celebration itself. 
We should compare just what the respective objects of 
reasoning and celebration are. We have already seen that 
Anselm's reasoning aims at a vision of God by showing how 
his argument implies all his various beliefs about God. One 
implication of the claim that Anselm's reasoning is criti-
cal, that it leads him to discover its limit, is that its 
objects are Anselm's beliefs, namely: that God truly is, 
that God is merciful, that God is just, that God is the life 
by which God lives, etc. Anselm discovers that his reasoning 
does not concern God as God is, but rather God as he be-
lieves God to be--that is, how God seems to him. 
His celebration is different. All of the particular 
36 Ibid.: "Excita nunc, anima mea, et erige totum 
intellectum tuum, et cogita, quantum pates, quale et quantum 
sit illud bonum." 
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questions that he asks as part of his celebration aim at one 
object: "the one necessary thing ••• which is every good." 
These questions have a general form, which the reasoning he 
uses to exhort his soul to consider them suggests. He con-
tinues: 
If individual goods are delightful, think attentively 
how delightful that good must be, which contains the 
delight of all goods--and not such [delight] as we 
experience in created things, but as different from it 
as the creator differs from the creature. 37 
With each of the questions that follows Anselm specifies one 
aspect of the delight to be found in created things, and 
with each he asks his soul how good that particular delight 
mu.st be in the God who created it. Anselm spends the next 
chapter, Chapter 25, going through a list of delights that 
one might love and explaining how each one will be found 
most of all in God. 
What is important to note in all this is that Anselm's 
manner of thinking has shifted. His thinking does remain 
just what he defined thinking to be early in the book: it is 
still a "saying in the heart." Anselm's thinking still 
unfolds in speech. It is still his struggle to say what he 
feels. This is true of his celebration no less than it is of 
the analysis of his argument. But the grammar of his speech, 
the grammar of his thinking, has undergone a dramatic 
37 Ibid., 117-8: "Si enim singula bona delectabilia sunt, 
cogita intente quam delectibile sit illud bonum, quod continet 
iucunditatem omnium bonorum; et non qualem in rebus creatis 
sumus experti, sed tanto differentem, quanto differt creator 
a creatura." 
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change. Anselm no longer uses the indicative. Here, Anselm 
thinks an imperative that commands an interrogative. He 
commands himself to ask. Rather than trying to express what 
God is, he commands himself to ponder how good God must be. 
This shift is a promising solution to the problem he 
encountered when he discovered that his argument fails to 
enable him to see God as God is. For us to see this, howev-
er, it is necessary to go back for a moment to the very 
beginning of the book. In its preface, Anselm writes that he 
wrote the Proslogion, "in the persona of someone trying to 
lift up his mind towards contemplating God and of one seek-
ing to understand what he believes." 38 The analysis of the 
one argument fails to lift Anselm's mind to the contempla-
tion of God and to enable him to understand what he believes 
because it brings him to discover that such thinking must 
fall short. 
That discovery is the discovery that he has been think-
ing only about what he believes. This fact about his think-
ing is, however, both a fact about Anselm and fact about God 
because, for Anselm, to think truths is to think the Truth. 
Anselm, however,.emphasizes the sense in which the discovery 
of the distance between what God is and how God seems to him 
is a discovery about himself. In Chapter 14, when he con-
eludes at first that he has found no more than the individu-
38 Ibid., 93-4: "sub persona conantis erigere mentem suam 
ad contemplandum deum et quaerentis intelligere quod credit, 
subditum scripsi opusculum." 
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al truths he has considered, he then corrects himself, "[My 
soul] strains so that it might see more, and it sees nothing 
beyond what it has seen except darkness; rather, it does not 
see darkness, which is not in You, but it sees that it 
cannot see more because of its darkness. " 39 Anselm's soul 
sees that beyond the various truths it has been able to see 
in its argument, it sees only its own darkness. 
His celebration, however, takes him farther. It does not 
require that he express what God is, but only that he turn 
his attention away from himself and towards God. Each of the 
questions he commands himself to ask begins in him, but 
points away from where it starts. The first can serve as an 
example. Anselm asks, "If created life is good, how good is 
the life that creates?" 40 He is to think how good his own 
life is in order to wonder how good God's life must be. All 
the other questions that serve his celebration take the same 
form. 
But here too Anselm finally admits his own failure. 
Anselm's celebration, the attempt to see or understand what 
God is by asking himself how good God must be, does not go 
far enough. He confesses in the first part of Chapter 26 
that nothing that he has said or considered has allowed him 
39 Ibid., 111: "Intendit se ut plus videat, et nihil videt 
ultra hoc quod vidit, nisi tenebras; immo non videt tenebras, 
quae nullae sunt in te, sed videt se non plus posse videre 
propter tenebras suas." 
40 Ibid., 118: "Si enim bona est vita creata, quam bona 
est vita creatrix?" 
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to see what he would like to see. He writes, "I have not yet 
spoken of or thought how greatly Your blessed ones will 
rejoice. " 41 And here even his celebration ends. 
Not even thi~, however, is the end of the Proslogion. 
The Proslogion ends the way that it began. The character of 
Anselm's thinking shifts a second and last time. At the 
realization that even his celebration falls short, Anselm 
turns to prayer. He writes, "God, I ask that I may know You, 
that I may love You, so I may rejoice about You." But here, 
because he has discovered how limited he is, he adds that 
even if he cannot succeed completely here, in this life, he 
still wishes to make progress until his joy is complete in 
another. 42 
Just as it is possible to describe the first shift in 
Anselm's thinking as a shift in the grammar of his thinking, 
so too this second one. Whereas his celebration was an 
imperative that commanded him to ask, his prayer is simply 
interrogative. Anselm asks God for the understanding that he 
seeks. 
And here again, the shift is promising. To see this one 
need only consider what leads Anselm to judge that his 
celebration has failed. His sense that the analysis of his 
41 Ibid., 121: "Nondum ergo dixi aut cogitavi Domine, 
quantum gaudebunt illi beati tui." 
42 Ibid., 121: "Oro, Deus, cognoscam te, amem te, ut 
gaudeam de te. Et si non possum in hac vita ad plenum, vel 
proficiam in dies, usque dum veniat illud ad plenum." 
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argument falls short arises out of an experience--the feel-
ing he has that he has not found God. His sense, however, 
that his celebration has failed arises when he faces a text 
from scripture that tells him that it could not have 
succeeded. He writes, "But surely that joy, in which Your 
chosen ones shall rejoice, neither the eye has seen, nor has 
the ear heard, nor has it arisen in the heart of a man. " 43 
Anselm cites First Corinthians 2:9. It tells him that what-
ever he might command himself to ask, he will not, as a man, 
experience the full joy of seeing God, the good, whom he 
asks about. 
It should come as no surprise that the evidence he turns 
to is authority. Anselm has, after all, explicitly gone 
beyond what his own reasoning can teach him, and his experi-
ence cannot be expected, by itself, to show him its own 
limit. He cannot experience that his experience falls short. 
To do so would require that he experience something beyond 
his experience. We should also note, however, that, faced 
with the limit of his ability to celebrate God, he no more 
repudiates his celebration than he did his reasoning. 
When Anselm prays for further help, he does not, to be 
·sure, overcome this limit, but he looks forward with hope to 
the possibility that he will overcome it someday. He looks 
forward with hope to the possibility that God will grant him 
43 Ibid. , 121: "Sed gaudium illud certe, quo gaudebunt 
electi tui, nee oculus vidit, nee auris audivit, nee in cor 
horninis ascendit." 
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more than he can achieve himself. As Anselm prays in Chapter 
26, he is hopeful, even confident. He expresses this confi-
dence near the very end of the work: 
Lord, through Your son You command, or rather You coun-
sel [us] to seek and You promise [that we will] receive 
so that our joy will be complete. I seek, Lord, what You 
counsel ••• May I receive what You promise ••• so that my 
joy will be complete. 44 
In this final passage, Anselm makes two things clear: first, 
that the whole work is a search that aims at an experience 
of God that it cannot, by the means Anselm has, ever bring 
about; and second, that as the one who undertakes that 
search Anselm feels that he is doing what he can to deserve 
the experience. 
But the passage also suggests why the Proslogion must be 
a prayer. Anselm has used two means to try to look at God: 
he tries to express what God is and to celebrate how great 
God's goodness must be. The first means can point to its own 
shortcoming. The second raises questions, but offers no 
answers. Prayer goes farther in two senses. On one hand, 
once Anselm discovers that he has no means that can bring 
him to understand God as he desires to, all he can do is ask 
for more help, and this help is just what he prays for. On 
the other hand, the only means that Anselm has of saying 
exactly what he believes God to be is direct address. When 
44 Ibid.: "Domine, per filium tuum iubes, immo consulis 
petere et promittis accipere, ut gaudium nostrum plenum sit. 
Peto, Domine, quod consul is per admirabilem consiliarium 
nostrum; accipiam, quod prommitis per veritatem tuam, ut 
gaudium meum plenum sit." 
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Anselm says "you~" he need not wonder whom he is speaking 
to. He speaks as one who has turned to, or lifted himself up 
towards, God. When Anselm says "you," he is directing him-
self to God as precisely as he can. 
He can direct himself to God as a "you," because God has 
been with him from the start. This I have argued in several 
places. When, in the beginning, he says what he believes God 
to be, his words have meaning because God is already with 
him. That is why the fool is a fool and not an atheist. When 
he discovers that his argument is critical, he discovers 
that his first attempt to lift his mind to the contemplation 
of God has turned his attention to an aspect of himself--
namely, what he believes about God, or what God seems to be. 
He makes this discovery by reflecting upon the difference 
between the God he has found in his reasoning and the God 
whose presence he feels. 
His celebration is his struggle to turn his attention 
from himself to God. It is a second attempt to lift his mind 
to the contemplation of God, but he is convinced that it 
does not bring him to see how good God must be. It does, 
however, point him once more towards God, and this fact is 
reflected in his closing prayer. This prayer attempts nei-
ther to say what· God is nor to ask how good God must be. It 
identifies God as a "you," a companion vividly present to 
him, one who can be addressed. 
In the final analysis, then, the Proslogion is a prayer 
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that asks for an experience, or an understanding, of God. It 
is worth noting that, as such, it closely parallels the 
general outline of Anselm's other prayers. Sister Benedicta 
Ward, who describes that outline, includes the Proslogion in 
her translation of Anselm's prayers. She writes of the 
prayers generally that they, "are meant to be said in soli-
tude, and the aim is to stir the mind out of its inertia to 
know itself thoroughly and so come to contrition and the 
love of God. " 45 She adds, with reference specifically to the 
Proslogion, that it is "set in the form of a prayer and 
follows the Anselmian pattern of withdrawal, self-knowledge, 
and compunction. " 46 
This is easy enough to confirm. The Proslogion begins 
with an exhortation that aims at stirring the mind (Chapter 
1). The analysis· of the argument leads Anselm to self-knowl-
edge, the discovery of the limit of his argument, which 
leads Anselm to contrition. He writes in Chapter 18: 
I was trying to rise up to the light of God, and I fell 
back into my darkness. Or, rather, I did not fall back 
into it, but I perceived myself to be enveloped in it. I 
fell before my mother conceived me. Surely I was con-
ceived in it, and was born wrapped up by it. Surely we 
all once fell in him in whom we all sinned. 47 
45 The Prayers and Meditations of Saint Anselm with the 
Proslogion, trans. and with an intro. by Sister Benedicta 
Ward, (London: Penguin Books, 1973), 51. 
46 Ibid., 79. 
47 Anselm, 114: "Conabar assurgere ad lucem Dei, et recidi 
in tenebras meas. Immo non modo cecidi in eas, sed sentio me 
involutum in eis. Ante cecidi, quam conciperet me mater mea. 
Certe in illis conceptus sum, et cum earum obvolutione natus 
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Finally, this failure leads him to wonder how good God must 
be. 
But though Sister Benedicta sees this form, she herself 
makes little of it. For though she notices that the argument 
is "a statement about what is beyond our thought, " 48 she has 
nothing to say about how Anselm's analyses are connected to 
his conviction that God is beyond his thought. I have argued 
that this is first and foremost a conviction that rises out 
of the experience that nothing he is able to see of God by 
means of his argument shows him what he wants to see. 
If, however, I am to explain the work in this way, there 
is one more matter to discuss: this is not how Anselm de-
scribes what moves him to seek. In the preface to the work, 
he writes that since the Monologion, which he had already 
written, was "woven together by the interconnection of many 
arguments, " 49 he began to search with himself to discover 
whether there might be "one argument." I have already dis-
cussed what he says he wants that single argument to accom-
plish. From the perspective of all I have said, however, one 
might be tempted to conclude that he does not find his argu-
ment, or that he finds an argument that fails, that all he 
really finds is his own need for further help from God. But 
sum. Olim certe in illo cecidimus, in quo omnes peccavimus." 
48 Ward, 80. 
49 Anselm, 93: " ••• considerans illud esse multorum 
concatenatione contextum argumentorum ••• " 
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if this is what Anselm thinks of his one argument, why does 
he not say so clearly? Why does he leave the Proslogion, the 
record of a search that seems to fail? It would be easy to 
argue that he cannot claim to follow the advice that God 
gives him--that is, the advice to seek--unless he makes some 
effort, but should one not expect him to discard the argu-
ment completely if all he discovers is that it must fail? 
I myself do not think the question is a fair one, and 
this for two reasons. In the first place, the discovery that 
the analysis of his one argument cannot bring him to the 
vision of God that he seeks is hardly a failure of the 
argument. It is, after all, just this discovery that moves 
Anselm to think in other ways. To say that the argument 
fails is not quite right; it would be better to say that it 
falls short. It enables Anselm to progress, but not to 
complete the task he aims at. 
To explain the second reason I must discuss one aspect 
of the work that I have not considered thus far. I must 
consider Anselm's brothers, the monks for whom he writes the 
work. Those monks asked Anselm to write a justification of 
the tenets of their faith that depended on reason alone. The 
book that resulted was the Monologion. Anselm must have been 
unhappy with the book. Something about that book moved him 
to look farther, and there are stories that have come down 
to us through his student, Eadmer, about the fervor with 
which he sought for the insight he felt he needed. Anselm 
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himself describes that fervor in the Proslogion's preface. 
The insight he found became the argument that drives the 
first part of the Proslogion, and Anselm spends, I have 
argued, the middle part of the book overcoming it. Anselm 
might then have discarded the insight, but he is writing for 
those who desire reasons, who want analytical thought. If he 
had rejected the desire for such thinking outright, they 
might simply have turned elsewhere. The virtue of the 
Proslogion is that it begins where the brothers it was 
written for start: with the desire to understand by means of 
the analytical thinking, the reasoning, that strives to ex-
press what something is. 
In fact, whether Anselm could ever discard his argument, 
even if it finally shows him its own limit, is at the very 
least an open question. If discursive reason is part of what 
characterizes us as what we are, then the need for an argu-
ment that points us beyond that part of us may never disap-
pear. The existence of 900 years of interpretations that 
attend only to Anselm's argument may be the strongest evi-
dence that many of us do look for arguments--much as 
Anselm's brothers did. In this sense, Anselm can confess 
with confidence that he is looking for God, because he has 
shown that his means of seeking has taken him as far as he 
can go. 
If, however,. the Proslogion ends in prayer, it is a 
prayer that is in part determined by the thinking that has 
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preceded it. Anselm's argument is not superfluous to his 
search for understanding. It is the rigorous pursuit of a 
thinking that begins in prayer that turns Anselm to celebra-
tion. Celebration, in turn, turns him back to prayer.-
I set out to study Anselm's book in order to consider 
how thinking can bring us to understanding. What I have 
discovered is how Anselm's thinking orients him toward what 
he desires to see. His thinking is his "saying in the 
heart," his attempt to express what he feels about God. We 
have seen that this begins as the attempt to articulate what 
God is. When Anselm realizes that such thinking turns him 
less to what God is than to what God seems to be, it also 
turns him to wonder at the good that God must be. Anselm 
celebrates that goodness, and that celebration constitutes a 
second attempt to express what he feels about God. When 
Anselm concludes that even this celebration fails to bring 
him to see, or understand, God, he turns to address God 
directly. Here, in a sense, he does express what God is: God 
is one who is present to him. He can speak to God and ask 
God for further help. 
Just how much of what is true of Anselm's thinking about 
God is also true of thinking generally may remain an open 
question. But this study has suggested that it is not enough 
to say what things seem to us to be. If we are to understand 
anything, we must struggle to turn our attention directly 
towards the things themselves. This does not mean that we 
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will succeed in seeing what we strive to see. In fact, if 
Anselm's case is an example, it suggests that we shall not. 
Anselm's example also suggests, however, that we make prog-
ress as we strive. 
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